GR L 31444; (November, 1974) (Digest)

G.R. No. L-31444 November 13, 1974
JOSE CANTILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon, Branch II, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MARAMAG, PROVINCE OF BUKIDNON; THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MARAMAG, CONRADO MICAYABAS, in his capacity as THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, MARAMAG, BUKIDNON, TORIBIO BALISTOY, in his capacity as THE VICE-MAYOR, MARAMAG, BUKIDNON and PEDRO ORMILLADA, in his capacity as THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, MARAMAG, BUKIDNON, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose Cantillo was appointed as a Temporary Municipal Policeman of Maramag, Bukidnon, on October 6, 1962. He subsequently received two more provisional appointments to the same position on November 2, 1964, and January 20, 1967. On October 16, 1967, he was suspended from office due to the filing of a criminal case for Infidelity in the Custody of a Prisoner. The case was provisionally dismissed on November 26, 1968, upon motion of the prosecution, which stated it lacked sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Cantillo then requested reinstatement and payment of back salaries for the period of his suspension, but the municipality refused.
Cantillo filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon to compel the payment of his back salaries, invoking Section 4 of Republic Act No. 557 (reenacted in Section 16 of Republic Act No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966). This provision states that a police officer suspended due to a criminal accusation is entitled to payment of entire back salaries upon acquittal. The trial court dismissed his petition, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner Jose Cantillo is entitled to payment of back salaries during his period of suspension.

RULING

No, the petitioner is not entitled to back salaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the mandamus petition. The legal logic rests not on the interpretation of the suspension and acquittal rule, but on the fundamental invalidity of Cantillo’s appointment. The governing law at the time of his last provisional appointment in 1967 was the Police Act of 1966 (R.A. No. 4864). Section 9 of this Act sets general qualifications for police appointments, including an age limit of 23 to 33 years and, for municipal police, completion of at least high school.
The stipulated facts showed Cantillo was already 41 years old at his first appointment in 1962 and about 46 years old in 1967, far exceeding the maximum age. He had also only completed second-year high school. These were not mere lacks of civil service eligibility but absences of statutory qualifications for the office itself. While Section 11 of the same Act allowed provisional appointments when no eligibles were available, it explicitly required the appointee to possess at least the general qualifications under Section 9. Cantillo did not.
Consequently, his appointment was void from the beginning. He was, at best, a de facto officer entitled only to emoluments for actual services rendered, not to salaries for a period of suspension. The tolerance or mistake of officials in appointing him could not validate the appointment or circumvent the legal requirements. Given this foundational defect, the Court deemed it unnecessary to resolve whether the provisional dismissal of the criminal case constituted an “acquittal” under the relevant statute entit