G.R. No. L-31255 May 31, 1982
ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLON, petitioner, vs. HON. PIO B. FERANDOS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Marcial A. Edillon, a practicing lawyer, filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul two orders issued by respondent Judge Pio B. Ferandos. The first order, dated October 14, 1969, declared Edillon guilty of direct contempt of court in Civil Case No. 204-T. The court found statements in a memorandum he filed as counsel to be highly derogatory and contemptuous, imposing a fine of P150.00 or subsidiary imprisonment of eight days. The second order, dated October 27, 1969, denied Edillon’s motion to dismiss or amend the complaint in Administrative Case No. 6-T, a separate proceeding initiated by the judge himself for Edillon’s suspension from the practice of law.
The respondent Judge moved to dismiss the petition. He argued that the contempt order had already been executed, with Edillon having served the penalty of imprisonment, rendering that issue a fait accompli and moot. Regarding the administrative case, the Judge asserted that it had been terminated prior to the filing of this petition, with an order dated November 24, 1969, suspending Edillon from practice for one year. That order and the complete records had already been transmitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review under Section 29, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition has been rendered moot and academic by the supervening execution of the contempt penalty and the termination of the administrative suspension proceeding.

RULING

Yes, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. The legal logic is grounded in the principle that courts will not adjudicate cases where no actual, live controversy exists that would yield any practical relief. For the contempt order, the penalty had been fully served. A certiorari proceeding to annul an order that has already been executed serves no practical purpose, as it cannot undo the completed service of imprisonment. The matter is therefore moot.
Concerning the administrative case, the respondent Judge correctly noted that the proceedings below had concluded with the issuance of the suspension order. The proper remedy for the petitioner was not a writ of prohibition to enjoin further proceedings, as there were none left to enjoin. Instead, the Rules of Court provided the specific remedy of automatic review by the Supreme Court of the suspension order itself, which process had already been initiated with the transmittal of the records. Since the reliefs sought in the petition—annulment of the orders and an injunction against the administrative case—were no longer viable or necessary due to these supervening events, the Court dismissed the petition. No costs were awarded.