G.R. No. L-30738 July 30, 1982
BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS, TRUSTEE OF THE LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE ZULUETA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On November 23, 1955, a final judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 22237 ordering Jose Zulueta to pay the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) a sum of money. On March 5, 1965, the Board of Liquidators, as trustee of the abolished LASEDECO, filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 60112) to revive this judgment. The trial court dismissed this first revival action on March 12, 1966, for failure to serve summons and lack of prosecution.
Thereafter, on May 10, 1966, the Board filed a second complaint for revival (Civil Case No. 65341). The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground of prescription, arguing that more than ten years had passed since the 1955 judgment became final. The trial court initially denied the motion, reasoning that the filing of the first action in 1965 interrupted the prescriptive period. However, after the plaintiff presented its evidence, the trial court ultimately dismissed the second complaint, holding that the earlier dismissal of the first action left the parties as if no suit had been filed and did not toll the ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of the first action for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 60112) interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, thereby preventing the second action (Civil Case No. 65341) from being time-barred.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal. The legal logic is anchored on Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which states that the prescription of actions is interrupted by the filing of an action in court. This provision is unqualified and applies regardless of the subsequent fate of the filed action, including its dismissal for lack of prosecution. The Court explicitly rejected the trial court’s reliance on the old doctrine in Conspecto v. Fruto, which held that a dismissed action leaves the parties in the same position as if no action was commenced. The Court clarified that under the present Civil Code, the act of filing the complaint itself constitutes the interruptive act, not the outcome of the case.
Consequently, the ten-year prescriptive period for enforcing the 1955 judgment was interrupted on March 5, 1965, when the first revival action was filed. The period resumed running only after its dismissal on March 12, 1966. When the second action was filed on May 10, 1966, less than ten years had effectively lapsed from the finality of the original judgment. The Court also noted that written extrajudicial demands made by the plaintiff constituted additional interruptive acts. Since the defendant presented no contradictory evidence, the Supreme Court rendered judgment on the merits, ordering the defendant to pay the adjudged amount with interest.