GR L 30036; (April, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-30036 April 15, 1988
MARCOS BORDAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SENCENO CANA DALLA and PRIMO TABAR, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Marcos Bordas was allegedly sideswiped by a jeepney driven by defendant-appellee Senceno Canadalla, an employee of co-defendant Primo Tabar, the jeepney owner. Canadalla was criminally charged with Serious Physical Injuries Through Reckless Imprudence before the City Court of Cebu. While that criminal case was pending, Bordas filed a separate civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana (quasi-delict) against both Canadalla and Tabar.
The defendants moved to dismiss the civil case, arguing that Bordas failed to make an express reservation to file a separate civil action in the criminal case, as required by the Rules of Court for civil actions arising from the offense. The City Court granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Cebu affirmed this dismissal on appeal, holding that the conviction in the criminal case was a prejudicial question to the civil liability.
ISSUE
Whether a separate civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana (quasi-delict) requires a prior reservation in the pending criminal case for reckless imprudence.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the lower courts’ orders. The legal logic is clear: a civil action based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is entirely independent and distinct from a civil action arising from criminal negligence under the Revised Penal Code. The lower court erred in treating them as the same and in considering the criminal conviction a prejudicial question. An action based on quasi-delict does not derive from the criminal liability of the accused; it is a separate civil wrong that exists independently of the criminal proceeding.
Consequently, the requirement to reserve the right to file a separate civil action under the Rules of Court does not apply to independent civil actions like one based on quasi-delict. This principle is reinforced by the 1964 amendments to the Rules, which explicitly removed the reservation requirement for independent civil actions and clarified that actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code proceed independently of any criminal prosecution. Therefore, Bordas’s civil case for quasi-delict could proceed independently and simultaneously with the criminal case for reckless imprudence, without need for any prior reservation. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
