GR L 29985; (October, 1982) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-29985 October 23, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARIO M. BUNDALIAN, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On June 11, 1964, Senator Gaudencio E. Antonino filed a sworn complaint for libel against Mario M. Bundalian before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. An Information was subsequently filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that Bundalian, with malicious intent, wrote, published, and distributed a memorandum containing defamatory statements against Senator Antonino. The memorandum used language imputing defects such as “collapse of sanity,” “egotism,” “delusion,” “ill motive,” and “questionable intention” to the Senator.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Senator Antonino died in November 1967 before he could testify. Subsequently, on September 2, 1968, Bundalian filed a Motion to Quash, arguing primarily that the libel charge did not survive the death of the offended party. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case on that ground. The People of the Philippines appealed the dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the death of the offended party in a criminal case for libel extinguishes the criminal liability of the accused.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and reinstated the criminal case. The legal logic is firmly grounded on statutory law. The causes for extinguishing criminal liability are exclusively enumerated in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, and the death of the offended party is not among them. Similarly, Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which lists the grounds for a motion to quash, does not include this event.
The Court rejected the trial court’s reasoning that the affront was purely personal to the deceased Senator and that his pre-testimony death abated the action. The right of confrontation and cross-examination guaranteed to the accused pertains only to witnesses who actually testify, not to potential witnesses who do not. The prosecution is not legally required to present the offended party as a witness, and his inability to testify due to death does not prejudice the accused’s constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the libel charged is not a private crime prosecutable only upon the express complaint of the offended party. Since the Information was filed by the public prosecutor for a libel that can be prosecuted de oficio, the criminal action is public in character. The death of the complainant after the filing of the Information does not extinguish the state’s interest in prosecuting the offense. The Court found no legal basis in Philippine jurisprudence or statute to support the proposition that the offended party’s death abates a pending libel prosecution. The case was remanded for trial on the merits.