G.R. No. L-29803 September 14, 1979
LEOPOLDO POBLETE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DONATO FABROS and GODOFREDO DE LA CRUZ, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Leopoldo Poblete filed an action for damages against Donato Fabros and Godofredo de la Cruz arising from a vehicular accident. Poblete, as owner of a damaged taxicab, sued de la Cruz as the alleged negligent driver and Fabros as the owner of the offending vehicle and de la Cruz’s employer. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Davao dismissed the case sua sponte.
The trial court held that the complaint sought to enforce the subsidiary liability of employer Fabros under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the criminal negligence of his driver. The court ruled the action was premature because no prior criminal conviction had been secured against the driver, who had died during the pendency of the civil case. Consequently, the trial court concluded the complaint stated no cause of action.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint on the ground that it alleged an action to enforce the subsidiary criminal liability of an employer, which is premature absent a prior criminal conviction, rather than an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal. The Court held that the trial court erred in characterizing the action as one based on subsidiary liability arising from a crime. A proper examination of the complaint’s allegations reveals it clearly states a cause of action based on quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The complaint expressly alleged gross negligence by the driver, de la Cruz, and an employer-employee relationship between him and Fabros. It prayed that the defendants be held “jointly and severally” liable, a concept antithetical to subsidiary liability, which is merely accessory and secondary. Furthermore, defendant Fabros himself understood the action as one based on quasi-delict, as evidenced by his answer where he raised the defense of having observed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising his employee—a defense specifically pertinent to an Article 2180 quasi-delict claim.
The civil liability arising from quasi-delict is separate and distinct from civil liability arising from crime, as established in Barredo vs. Garcia. An action based on quasi-delict against an employer for the negligent act of an employee is primary and direct, not subsidiary. It proceeds independently of any criminal action and is not preconditioned on a criminal conviction. The death of the driver-defendant is no bar to continuing the action against the employer based on this independent civil liability. The case was remanded to the trial court for judgment on the merits based on the evidence already presented.