G.R. No. L-29648 October 26, 1968
FRANCISCO SOCORRO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NORA VARGAS and LEOCADIO VARGAS, defendants-appellees, PABLO DUMLAO, intervenor-appellee.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant Francisco Socorro, a timber concessionaire, filed a complaint for breach of contract against defendant-appellee spouses Nora and Leocadio Vargas, sawmill owners and operators. The complaint contained four causes of action: (1) recovery of unpaid forest charges, sales taxes, and the price of logs; (2) reimbursement for expenses advanced; (3) payment for the value of a carabao; and (4) actual and moral damages for the alleged surreptitious cutting and removal of 300,000 board feet of export logs sold to foreign buyers. Defendants, in their answer, did not contest the genuineness of the contract and met the first three causes with a “no knowledge” allegation, while defending the fourth by claiming plaintiff’s knowledge and consent. Intervenor-appellee Pablo Dumlao moved to intervene, asserting that part of the 300,000 board feet came from his concession area and that a boundary dispute existed between his and plaintiff’s concessions. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the complaint failed to state a cause of action as it was premature due to an unresolved boundary dispute that should first be settled administratively in the Bureau of Forestry. The lower court dismissed the entire complaint without prejudice, citing the need to first settle the boundary conflict administratively.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action due to a purported boundary dispute requiring prior administrative settlement.

RULING

Yes, the lower court’s order of dismissal was set aside and declared null and void. The Supreme Court ruled that: (1) The motion to dismiss pertained only to the fourth cause of action, yet the lower court erroneously dismissed the entire complaint. The first three causes of action, involving distinct monetary claims, were not involved in any boundary dispute and could stand independently. (2) The alleged boundary dispute was inconsequential. The intervenor’s claim was indefinite, stating only that “part” of the logs came from his area without specifying details. Furthermore, plaintiff’s case was for breach of contract, which defendants did not deny, and their defense to the fourth cause was merely that the shipment was with plaintiff’s knowledge and consent—a factual issue. (3) The issue raised in the fourth cause of action, based on the pleadings, was purely factual and could not be determined in a motion to dismiss. In ruling on such a motion, only the allegations of the complaint, presumed true, should be considered. The lower court erred in judging the validity of the cause of action based on unproven facts. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.