G.R. No. L-29375 September 5, 1975
EARNSHAWS DOCKS & HONOLULU IRON WORKS, petitioner, vs. DOMINGO SORTIJAS and THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

FACTS

Domingo Sortijas was employed by Earnshaws Docks as a steelworker. In 1952, he contracted pulmonary tuberculosis, a compensable illness, which disabled him from work until April 1964. After being apparently cured, he was re-employed on July 14, 1964. However, his illness recurred ten days later, on July 24, 1964, rendering him unfit for work. He was permanently separated from service on March 12, 1965. For his initial disability period ending in 1964, he received the maximum compensation of P4,000 under the then-governing Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 772 , and executed a release and waiver.
Subsequently, Sortijas filed a claim for additional compensation related to the recurrence of his illness in July 1964. The Acting Referee awarded him P2,000, applying the higher maximum of P6,000 under Republic Act No. 4119 , which amended the Compensation Act and took effect on June 20, 1964. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, on appeal, modified the award, granting Sortijas a total of P5,842.70 plus weekly benefits, not exceeding the P6,000 maximum under R.A. 4119. The employer, Earnshaws Docks, contested this, arguing it had fully discharged its liability with the earlier P4,000 payment and that the law in force during the initial disability should govern.

ISSUE

The primary legal issue is whether the recurrence of a compensable illness after re-employment constitutes a new and separate cause of action, and consequently, which version of the Workmen’s Compensation Act governs the computation of benefits for this subsequent disability.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. The Court held that a recurrence of a compensable illness after an employee has been re-employed gives rise to a distinct and separate cause of action from the original illness. The legal logic is grounded in the employer’s assumption of risk upon re-employment. When Earnshaws Docks rehired Sortijas with knowledge of his prior medical history, it accepted the potential liability for any new disability arising from a recurrence of the disease.
Since this new cause of action for the recurrence accrued on July 24, 1964, the law in effect at that time governs the compensation. Republic Act No. 4119 , which increased the maximum disability benefit to P6,000, had already taken effect on June 20, 1964. Therefore, the application of the amended law to compute benefits for the second disability was correct. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that its liability was extinguished by the prior payment and waiver, as those pertained only to the disability from the initial illness period. The compensation for the new disability triggered by the recurrence is a separate obligation subject to the law prevailing at the time of its occurrence.