G.R. No. L-29321 February 29, 1972
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPOINTMENT OF JUDGE ALEJANDRO B. PALLUGNA, JR., AS NOTARY PUBLIC. ALEJANDRO B. PALLUGNA, JR., petitioner-appellant.

FACTS

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental revoking the notarial commission of Municipal Judge Alejandro B. Pallugna, Jr. of Magsaysay. The lower court’s order was based on a 1946 opinion of the Secretary of Justice stating that a justice of the peace (municipal judge) may not engage in notarial work except in an ex officio capacity. Judge Pallugna had been a commissioned notary public for Misamis Oriental since 1957, and his commission was regularly renewed even after his judicial appointment in 1964. He performed notarial services outside the territorial jurisdiction of his court in Magsaysay.
In his defense, Judge Pallugna argued that no law expressly prohibited a municipal judge from being a notary public for places outside his court’s jurisdiction. He further contended that, under the then-existing Section 77 of the Judiciary Act, municipal judges were permitted to pursue other vocations or hold other offices provided they rendered at least four hours of judicial service daily. He claimed that notarial work was a natural adjunct to the practice of law, which he was authorized to engage in.

ISSUE

The sole issue is whether the Court of First Instance correctly revoked Judge Pallugna’s commission as a notary public.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation order, denying the appeal. The legal logic proceeds on two grounds. First, the issue had become moot and academic. Republic Act 6031, which amended the Judiciary Act and increased municipal judges’ salaries, withdrew the previous authorization for them to pursue other vocations, including the practice of law. A subsequent Department of Justice Circular expressly prohibited municipal judges from private law practice. Since Judge Pallugna’s claim to notarial work was predicated on his now-revoked privilege to practice law, and notarial commissions are renewable every two years, the controversy was rendered moot.
Second, even assuming the issue subsisted, appellant’s cause would fail based on substantive law. Contrary to his claim of no prohibition, the Revised Administrative Code imposed clear restrictions. Section 235 explicitly states that justices of the peace (municipal judges) “shall not act as notaries public except in the character of notaries public ex officio.” Furthermore, Section 242 limits the ex officio notarial authority of justices of the peace to acts performed “within the limits of the territory over which their jurisdiction as justices of the peace extends.” The law thus prohibits municipal judges from holding a regular notarial commission and confines their ex officio notarial functions to their own municipal jurisdiction. The Court clarified that while a notary public must be a lawyer, a notarial commission is not a prerequisite for law practice; it is a separate authority requiring a distinct commission, which the law expressly withholds from municipal judges beyond their ex officio capacity.