G.R. No. L-28949 June 23, 1969
JIBIN ARULA, petitioner, vs. Brigadier General ROMEO C. ESPINO, Members of the General Court-Martial, namely, CANDIDO B. GAVINO, President, CRISOGONO T. MAKILAN, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, SEGUNDINO S. QUINTANS, PEDRO FERNANDEZ, JOSE APOLINARIO, AVELINO MENEZ, EFRAIN MACLANG, and MABINI BERNABE, LAW Member, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Jibin Arula, was recruited by Capt. Teodoro R. Facelo of the AFP on December 17, 1967, and taken to Corregidor Island for training on January 3, 1968. On March 18, 1968, a shooting incident occurred on Corregidor, resulting in serious physical injuries to Arula. He fled and on March 23, 1968, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder with the City Fiscal of Cavite City against several individuals, including army personnel. On March 21 and 22, 1968, President Ferdinand Marcos, as Commander-in-Chief, ordered an investigation of the Corregidor killings and directed the creation of a court-martial. On April 6, 1968, respondent Brigadier General Romeo C. Espino issued Special Order 208, convening a general court-martial (composed of the other respondents) to try the army personnel involved, including those charged by Arula. The court-martial began proceedings, and on April 16, 1968, Arula testified before it. Meanwhile, on April 19, 1968, Armed Forces lawyers moved to dismiss the complaint before the City Fiscal of Cavite, arguing the civil courts had lost jurisdiction due to the convened court-martial. Arula filed the present petition for certiorari and/or prohibition on April 25, 1968, seeking to annul Special Order 208 and prohibit the court-martial from proceeding with his case.

ISSUE

1. Does the petitioner have the legal personality to institute and maintain the present action for certiorari and prohibition to stop the general court-martial from proceeding with the hearing of the case insofar as it concerns the injuries inflicted upon him?
2. If yes, does the general court-martial have jurisdiction over the case? This depends on the resolution of the sub-issues:
a. Whether the petitioner is a person subject to military law;
b. If he is not, whether Corregidor is a military reservation; and
c. Whether the filing by the petitioner of a criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City forthwith invested the Court of First Instance of Cavite with jurisdiction to try the case to the exclusion of the general court-martial.

RULING

1. Yes, the petitioner has legal personality. The Court held that the petitioner, as the offended party, has a substantial interest in the criminal proceedings against the accused because his right to civil indemnity is involved. He is, therefore, a real party in interest and can maintain the action to prohibit the court-martial from assuming jurisdiction.
2. No, the general court-martial does not have jurisdiction over the offense committed against the petitioner.
a. The petitioner is not a person subject to military law. The Court found that Arula was not formally enlisted or inducted into the army. His recruitment and presence on Corregidor did not make him a person subject to military law, as there was no valid enlistment contract. He remained a civilian.
b. Corregidor is a military reservation. The Court held that Corregidor, despite being declared a national shrine, remains a military reservation under the control and supervision of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as evidenced by laws and executive orders.
c. However, jurisdiction over the offense is vested in the civil courts, not the court-martial. The applicable law is Article of War 94, as amended by Republic Act 242. It provides that a person subject to military law who commits a felony inside a military reservation is subject to court-martial jurisdiction. However, if the offended party is not subject to military law, the case falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts. Since Arula, the offended party, is a civilian not subject to military law, the offense of frustrated murder committed against him on a military reservation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts (the Court of First Instance of Cavite), not the general court-martial.
d. The filing of the criminal complaint with the city fiscal did not immediately vest jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance to the exclusion of the court-martial. Jurisdiction of the civil court attaches only upon the filing of the information. The preliminary investigation before the fiscal is merely preparatory. The court-martial, having been convened earlier (pursuant to the President’s March 22 order, before Arula’s March 23 complaint), could have acquired prior jurisdiction if it had been the proper tribunal. However, since the court-martial lacks jurisdiction over the offense against Arula ab initio due to his civilian status, the question of which tribunal acquired jurisdiction first becomes moot.
The Court made the temporary restraining order permanent and prohibited the respondents from further proceeding with the court-martial trial concerning the shooting and wounding of petitioner Jibin Arula.