G.R. No. L-28927 September 25, 1968
Laguna College, petitioner, vs. Court of Industrial Relations, Laguna College Teachers Association (LACTA)-CCLU and The Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Laguna College filed a petition for certification election in the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 2037-MC) to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of its teachers. Respondent Laguna College Teachers Association (LACTA) intervened, seeking dismissal of the petition and its direct certification. While the case was pending, LACTA staged a strike on January 2, 1968, settled by a return-to-work agreement on January 4, 1968. This agreement included a waiver by both parties of the right to appeal any decision or order of the Trial Court, except on questions of law. On March 11, 1968, the trial judge issued an order granting the certification election, defining the bargaining unit as comprising all teachers of the college, excluding twelve individuals deemed supervisors or confidential employees, and declaring eight specific teachers (Marcelo Almanzor, Eduardo Lainez, Adventor Neri, Moises Belen, Gregorio Briones, Olimpio Cortez, Sr., Guillermo Pisigan, and Pantaleon Torres) as rank-and-file employees eligible to vote. The order also limited the choice in the election to LACTA or “NO UNION.” Petitioner moved for reconsideration before the Court en banc, contesting the inclusion of the eight teachers as rank-and-file and the declaration of only one bargaining unit. The motion was denied on April 5, 1968. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, seeking modification of the orders and a restraining order, which the Court did not issue. The certification election proceeded on April 22, 1968, with petitioner’s participation. Respondent LACTA moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it had become moot and that petitioner was estopped due to its participation in the election.

ISSUE

1. Whether the eight named teachers are supervisors and should have been excluded from the rank-and-file bargaining unit.
2. Whether the Court of Industrial Relations gravely abused its discretion in declaring only one bargaining unit for all teachers instead of separate units for college and high school teachers.
3. Whether the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the holding of the certification election and petitioner’s participation therein.
4. Whether the supplemental petition alleging prematurity of the election and illegality of a subsequent strike should be entertained.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
1. On the classification of the eight teachers, the Court held the issue was mainly one of fact. The trial judge’s detailed analysis of the evidence, finding that these employees did not exercise the powers of a supervisor as defined in Section 2(k) of Republic Act No. 875 (such as the power to hire, fire, discipline, or adjust grievances), was supported by substantial evidence. The substantial-evidence rule precludes review on appeal. Furthermore, the waiver of the right to appeal on questions of fact in the return-to-work agreement barred appeal on this factual issue.
2. On the appropriate bargaining unit, the Court held that the determination of a single unit for all teachers was addressed to the sound discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations based on pertinent circumstances, such as the similarity in employment conditions, salary source, and job functions between college and high school teachers. No grave abuse of discretion was shown to justify reversal.
3. The petition was rendered moot and academic insofar as it sought to enjoin the certification election, as the election had already been held on April 22, 1968, and petitioner had actively participated in it. Any questions regarding the conduct of the election should be ventilated before the Court of Industrial Relations, which retained jurisdiction over the main case.
4. The supplemental petition was not seriously considered. The allegation that the election was held before the lapse of a “ten-day period” for review was a new matter not raised in the original petition and would effectively constitute an appeal beyond the reglementary period. No specific rule was cited to support the claim of prematurity. Furthermore, the issue of the legality of a subsequent strike on April 3, 1968, was a matter pertaining to a separate unfair labor practice charge and was rendered moot by the strikers’ return to work and acceptance by petitioner on May 6, 1968.