GR L 28699; (April, 1975) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-28699. April 29, 1975.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, and FRANCISCO LIM, respondents.
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the prosecution against the trial judge, Hon. Gregorio D. Montejo. The case arose from a joint trial of two criminal cases against respondent Francisco Lim for alleged violations of the Retail Trade Law and the Alien Registration Act, where the pivotal issue was Lim’s citizenship. The prosecution alleged that Lim’s election of Philippine citizenship was untimely, rendering him an alien. During the trial, the defense counsel engaged in a vigorous cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and presented documentary evidence. The prosecution objected, claiming these pertained to matters involving non-parties Fernando Nuevo and Porfirio Doctor, which were immaterial and would cause delay and confusion.
The prosecution’s petition argued that respondent Judge Montejo committed grave abuse of discretion by excessively allowing the introduction of this allegedly extraneous evidence. However, the defense’s answer clarified that at the stage of the proceedings, the defense had not yet presented its evidence, and the challenged questions and exhibits were part of cross-examination and pertained to matters raised in the prosecution’s own direct examination and documentary exhibits. The prosecution’s reply did not refute these clarifications.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Judge Gregorio D. Montejo committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the defense’s line of questioning and evidence during the trial, thereby warranting the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge. The legal logic is anchored on the well-established judicial policy of allowing parties considerable latitude in the presentation of evidence to prevent the defeat of justice. This doctrine, first enunciated in Prats and Co. v. Phoenix Insurance, holds that trial judges should be receptive to offers of proof and searching questions to elicit the truth, avoiding trivial objections to the admission of evidence, especially where its materiality may only become clear as the trial develops.
The Court noted that Judge Montejo was merely adhering to a prior Supreme Court admonition directed at him personally in People v. Montejo, which stressed the need for latitude in evidence presentation. His conduct was therefore not unorthodox but in faithful compliance with settled jurisprudence. The prosecution’s apprehension of a possible acquittal due to the admitted evidence is not a valid ground for certiorari or prohibition. Furthermore, the petition was premature, as the defense had not yet rested its case, and the trial judge is presumed competent to ultimately weigh the materiality of all evidence presented. The writs are extraordinary remedies granted only for capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, which was not present. The preliminary injunction was lifted, and the trial court was ordered to continue the joint trial forthwith.
