GR L 28505; (August, 1969) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-28505 August 29, 1969
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTANISLAO PINEDA, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The Philippine National Bank (plaintiff-appellee) filed an ejectment case against Estanislao Pineda (defendant-appellant) in the City Court of Manila. The City Court rendered a judgment ordering Pineda to vacate the premises within six months, provided he pays rent in arrears and updates rental payments, with attorney’s fees and costs assessed against him. Pineda appealed this decision to the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial. On the scheduled pre-trial date, October 20, 1967, despite the case being repeatedly called, Pineda and his counsel failed to appear. The Court of First Instance consequently dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute. Pineda’s efforts to reopen the case in the lower court were denied, prompting his appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed Pineda’s appeal for failure to prosecute due to his and his counsel’s non-appearance at the pre-trial.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. First, the failure of Pineda and his counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial is a valid ground for dismissal for failure to prosecute, which results in the revival of the inferior court’s judgment. The Court found Pineda’s excuse—that his counsel had withdrawn—to be “very flimsy” as the record did not support such withdrawal, and under the rules, notices are properly given to counsel of record. Second, Pineda failed to show any valid defense. He was a lessee without a fixed term, which explained the grace period given by the City Court. His claim of having a residential house on the land did not entitle him to reimbursement of one-half its value, as the option to acquire improvements under Article 1678 of the Civil Code belongs to the landowner. Therefore, reopening the case would be futile. Costs were imposed on Pineda.
Separate Opinion:
Justice Barredo concurred in the result, distinguishing this case from Vda. de Palanca vs. Chua Keng Kian. Here, the appeal was dismissed due to Pineda’s failure to appear at a set pre-trial, not mere inaction. Given that the record showed Pineda had no substantial defense, the dismissal order effectively functioned as a judgment on the pleadings, consistent with the purposes of pre-trial under the Rules of Court.