G.R. No. L-285; April 10, 1947
NICOLAS C. MERCADO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENITO GO BIO Y OTROS, occupants of the property, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Nicolas C. Mercado was the registered owner of a house built on two contiguous lots on Narra Street, Tondo, Manila. He resided on the upper floor with his family and operated a carriage shop on the ground floor. For reasons not clear in the record, Benito Go Bio became the registered owner of the property on February 28, 1938, via Transfer Certificate of Title No. 53004. The parties litigated and later settled, stipulating that Go Bio would reconvey the property to Mercado for P26,655.54, payable after a certain period under terms specified in a deed of transaction. One covenant was that Mercado would pay Go Bio P200 monthly as rental until repurchase, for which a 5-year period from February 21, 1938, was fixed. Mercado’s option to repurchase expired on February 21, 1943, and it appears he did not exercise it. In 1944, both parties filed motions with the court seeking execution of the judgment based on the settlement, but each interpreted the judgment differently; the confusion and hazards of war prevented action on these motions. What is certain is that when the present action was filed, the repurchase had not been definitively effected, and Go Bio remained the registered owner under TCT No. 53004.
In September 1944, six individuals from the Japanese Imperial Navy demanded that Mercado vacate the house as they needed it for habitation. Mercado complied, leaving the house and carriage shop and moving elsewhere. In February 1945, when the Japanese fled and the Americans arrived during the battle for the liberation of Manila, the house was abandoned. Go Bio then proceeded to occupy it and also allowed many other refugees, both Filipinos and Chinese, to lodge there. Go Bio claims to have spent about P10,000 on repairs to recondition the house from the disastrous effects of looting and pillage. It was proven without serious challenge that Go Bio and the refugees obtained the corresponding permit to occupy the house from the office of the American Army Provost Marshal, with a promise they would not be molested.
Some days later, Mercado appeared at the house and demanded that Go Bio and the refugees vacate it because he wanted to reoccupy it, a demand that was refused. Mercado then went to the municipal court and filed an action for forcible entry against Go Bio and the refugees (though not specifically naming them) and obtained a favorable judgment. On appeal, the Court of First Instance reversed the judgment and absolved the defendants. The present appeal was taken against that decision.

ISSUE

Does the plaintiff-appellant have the right to recover physical possession of the property under Rule 72, Section 1 of the Rules of Court (summary action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer)? In other words, can the summary action for recovery of possession instituted by the plaintiff prosper under the rule prescribing procedures in cases of deprivation of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth?

RULING

No. The plaintiff-appellant has no right of action against the defendants under Rule 72, Section 1.
The Court held that for an action under Rule 72, Section 1 to prosper, the defendant must have deprived the plaintiff of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth within one year prior to the filing of the action. The evidence established that it was the Japanese naval personnel, not the defendants, who demanded that Mercado vacate the property and thus deprived him of physical possession. There is no showing that the defendants had any part in the Japanese action, nor do the defendants claim any right derived from the Japanese (as “claiming under them” under the rule), as no juridical relation (e.g., grantor-grantee, principal and privy) existed between them.
Furthermore, the defendants did not obtain possession through strategy or stealth. They entered peacefully and openly, with the permission of the American Army Provost Marshal, at a time when the house was completely abandoned and at the mercy of looters. As the registered owner, Go Bio had every right to take possession to prevent further damage to the property. Mercado, at that point, was merely a lessee with an option to repurchase.
The Court rejected Mercado’s argument that Articles 444 and 446 of the Civil Code (protecting possession and providing for restitution) granted him a right to restitution in this summary proceeding. The summary action for forcible entry (formerly under Article 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure) presupposes prior physical possession, not merely the legal possession referred to in Article 444. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva (37 Phil. 752) and Apostol v. Andrin and Pilapil (42 Phil. 188), the Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s right of possession must be actual and existing at the time of the alleged deprivation. Since Mercado’s physical possession was lawfully terminated by the Japanese military’s order (the legality of which the Court did not need to resolve), his right to the summary remedy disappeared. Ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy); conversely, nullum jus nullum remedium (no right, no remedy).
The Court concluded that Mercado could not ventilate the issue of who had a better right or title to the property under the terms of their settlement in a summary action for forcible entry. Such a question must be raised in an action of greater scope, such as an action to recover ownership or title.
DISPOSITIVE:
The appealed judgment is affirmed in all respects, with costs against the appellant.