G.R. No. L-28214 July 30, 1969
NATIVIDAD V. A. JARODA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, and ANTONIO V. A. TAN, in his capacity as judicial administrator of intestate estate of Carlos Villa Abrille, Special Proc. No. 1391, Court of First Instance of Davao, respondents.

FACTS

The case involves Special Proceeding No. 1391 for the intestate estate of Carlos Villa Abrille. Respondent Antonio V. A. Tan, a grandson and heir, was appointed special administrator and later regular administrator. On May 5, 1965, the respondent court granted Tan’s ex-parte petition to withdraw P182,531.08 from Philippine National Bank accounts in the deceased’s name, which Tan alleged were held in trust for co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. On September 3, 1965, the court approved, ex-parte, a power of attorney executed by Tan appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell the estate’s share in the subdivision lots. Petitioner Natividad V. A. Jaroda, a daughter and heir, moved to nullify these orders, but the motion was denied. Her appeal was dismissed as interlocutory, and a prior certiorari petition (G.R. No. L-27831) was dismissed by the Supreme Court, stating appeal was the remedy. She then filed this certiorari petition, alleging irreparable injury as Tan was selling lots under the void order.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the orders dated May 5, 1965 (allowing withdrawal of bank deposits) and September 3, 1965 (approving the power of attorney for sale of estate property) without notice to the heirs and in approving improper transactions by the administrator.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the orders as null and void. The order of May 5, 1965 was an abuse of discretion because: (1) the withdrawal, effectively a waiver of the estate’s prima facie right to the deposits in favor of strangers, was foreign to a special administrator’s powers under Rule 80, Section 2, which are limited to preservation and sale of perishable property only by court order; and (2) it was issued ex-parte without the required notice to the heirs. The order of September 3, 1965 was void because: (1) it was issued without the written notice to interested heirs required by Rule 89, Section 4 for authorizing sales; and (2) it approved an improper auto-contract where the administrator appointed himself as agent to sell estate property, creating a conflict of interest and opening the door to fraud, contrary to fiduciary principles. The Court held that certiorari was proper as appeal would not be speedy enough to prevent irreparable injury from the ongoing sales. The preliminary injunction was made permanent. Costs were imposed on respondent Tan in his personal capacity.