G.R. No. L-27934 September 18, 1967
CONSTANTE PIMENTEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINO C. SALANGA, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Constante Pimentel, a practicing attorney, is counsel of record in several cases pending before respondent Judge Angelino C. Salanga of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV). These cases are: Civil Case 21-C (a mandamus action), Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5 (frustrated murder), Criminal Case C-93 (frustrated homicide), and Election Case 2470 (an election protest). Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against respondent judge before the Supreme Court on May 12, 1967, alleging “serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence” and seeking the judge’s suspension and removal. The Supreme Court referred this administrative case to Justice Eulogio Serrano of the Court of Appeals for investigation. On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved for respondent judge to disqualify himself from the aforementioned cases, praying for their transfer to another sala. Respondent judge denied the motion on August 1, 1967, stating the administrative complaint was not a cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court, that some cases were near final disposition, and that transfer would cause delay and violate Administrative Order 371. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari and/or prohibition, arguing that his career and his clients’ interests were prejudiced, and seeking to stop respondent judge from sitting in the cases.

ISSUE

Whether a judge is disqualified from acting in litigations where counsel of record for one of the parties is the judge’s adversary in a pending administrative case filed by said counsel.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. A judge is not legally disqualified from sitting in a case simply because the counsel for a party has filed an administrative complaint against him. Disqualification of judges is governed by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph enumerates specific legal grounds for disqualification (e.g., pecuniary interest, relationship within certain degrees, prior involvement as counsel). The second paragraph, added in the 1964 Rules, permits a judge to voluntarily disqualify himself “for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above” in the exercise of his sound discretion. The Court held that the permissive authority under the second paragraph refers exclusively to a situation where a judge voluntarily inhibits himself; it does not allow a litigant or counsel to disqualify a judge for grounds not specified in the first paragraph. Since an administrative complaint by counsel is not one of the enumerated grounds, respondent judge was not legally obligated to recuse himself. The Court emphasized that prejudice on the part of the judge is not to be presumed merely from the filing of an administrative complaint. However, the Court noted that a judge, in the exercise of sound discretion and to forestall any miscarriage of justice or uphold public confidence in the judiciary, could in good grace voluntarily inhibit himself in such a situation, especially where the case could be heard by another judge without appreciable prejudice to others. Since respondent judge chose not to do so and was not legally disqualified, the Supreme Court could not, via certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from trying and deciding the cases.