GR L 27849; (April, 1974) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-27849 and G.R. No. L-34432, April 30, 1974
Mackenzie Pio, petitioner, vs. Hon. Pio R. Marcos, Judge, Court of First Instance, Baguio City, et al.; and Trinidad Nevada, et al., intervenors, vs. Court of First Instance of Baguio City, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Mackenzie Pio filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Baguio to recover possession of a parcel of land and eight mining claims allegedly inherited from his father, and to obtain damages from respondent Philex Mining Corporation for its mining operations thereon. Pio subsequently sought a writ of preliminary injunction to halt Philex’s operations. The respondent judge initially granted the injunction upon Pio’s filing of a bond but, upon Philex’s motion for reconsideration, withheld the writ’s issuance pending resolution. This led Pio to file a mandamus petition (L-27849) to compel the judge to issue the writ. Concurrently, intervenors Trinidad Nevada, et al., filed a counter-petition (L-34432) challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over the mining dispute, arguing it fell under the exclusive authority of the Director of Mines.
ISSUE
The primary issues were: (1) Whether mandamus lies to compel the respondent judge to issue the writ of preliminary injunction; and (2) Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint concerning mining claims.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the mandamus petition. The issuance of a preliminary injunction is a discretionary judicial act, not a ministerial duty. Since Philex’s motion for reconsideration of the injunction order remained unresolved, the respondent judge was still exercising his judgment. Mandamus cannot control judicial discretion where no clear, certain right and corresponding specific legal duty exist.
On jurisdiction, the Court applied the doctrine from Philex Mining Corp. vs. Zaldivia. Republic Act No. 4388 , effective June 19, 1965, vested exclusive original jurisdiction over “conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations” in the Director of Mines, with appeals to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and then to the appellate courts. Pio’s second cause of action, which disputed Philex’s right to operate the mining claims under leases granted by the government, constituted such a mining conflict and was thus beyond the trial court’s jurisdiction. However, his first cause of action for recovery of possession of the surface land and for rentals, based on claims of hereditary ownership, was judicial in nature and properly within the court’s jurisdiction. Consequently, the deposit orders related to the cross-claims among intervenors, issued within this valid jurisdictional sphere, were upheld.