G.R. No. L-27674 May 12, 1975
SOLEDAD T. CONSING, assisted by her husband, ANTONIO M. CONSING, plaintiffs-petitioners, vs. JOSE T. JAMANDRE, personally, and as Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Cirilo Jamandre, defendant-respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Soledad Consing, as sub-lessee, entered into a contract of sub-lease with Cirilo Jamandre over Haciendas “Aida” and “Fe”. The contract required Consing to pay 1,000 piculs of “C” sugar and an annual advance of P20,000. Paragraph 9 of the contract stipulated that failure to comply with its terms authorized the sub-lessor to take over possession of the leased premises. After Cirilo Jamandre’s death, his son and judicial administrator, respondent Jose Jamandre, took possession of the haciendas on September 11, 1963, alleging petitioners’ failure to comply with the payment conditions. Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry and detainer in the Municipal Court, which ruled in their favor, ordering respondent to vacate and restore possession.
The respondent appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). Petitioners moved for summary judgment, which the CFI denied, proceeding to trial on the merits. The CFI, confining the issue to the interpretation of the contract and damages, ruled for the respondent, dismissing the complaint and ordering petitioners to pay P19,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, prompting the petitioners to elevate the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the respondent, as sub-lessor, could lawfully take possession of the leased property without judicial intervention, based solely on a contractual provision authorizing such action due to alleged breaches by the sub-lessee.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The legal logic centers on the principle that parties may contractually agree on a right of rescission and re-possession exercisable extrajudicially. The Court held that judicial action for rescission is not an absolute requirement under the law. Citing De la Rama Steamship Co. vs. Tan, the Court ruled that where a contract expressly grants a party the right to cancel the agreement and take possession upon the other party’s breach, that stipulation is valid and enforceable without prior court approval. Resort to judicial action is necessary only in the absence of such a special provision. Paragraph 9 of the sub-lease contract constituted such a valid special provision, authorizing the respondent to take over the premises upon petitioners’ alleged default.
The Court also addressed ancillary procedural matters. It found no error in the CFI’s reception of evidence regarding the contract’s interpretation, noting that while the core issue in forcible entry is possession de facto, courts may examine title or contractual terms to determine the character of possession and assess damages, as permitted by the Judiciary Act. Furthermore, the Court upheld the denial of the motion for summary judgment, as the respondent’s allegations of petitioners’ breach and his contractual right to re-possess presented genuine questions of fact precluding summary adjudication.