G.R. No. L-27550 November 25, 1967
ELEUTERIO DEANANEAS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE IGNACIO MANGOSING, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch III, and IGNACIA MUNCADA, respondents.

FACTS

In the November 12, 1963 elections, petitioner Eleuterio Deananeas and respondent Ignacia Muncada were candidates for vice-mayor of Laoang, Samar. Deananeas was proclaimed elected. Muncada filed an election protest (Election Case No. 332) in the Court of First Instance of Samar, presided by respondent Judge Ignacio Mangosing. After hearing, the respondent Judge rendered a decision on March 2, 1967, finding Muncada obtained 2,688 votes against Deananeas’s 2,673 votes, and declared Muncada the duly elected vice-mayor. The decision dealt only with ballot appreciation. On March 10, 1967, Deananeas filed a motion to set aside the judgment, arguing: (1) the protestant failed to introduce election returns from 14 precincts, providing insufficient basis for the contest’s outcome; and (2) 58 ballots were improperly counted for Muncada (41 ballots with only the nickname “Asyang” in the space for mayor, and 17 ballots with “A.. Muncada” for vice-mayor, which could refer to another candidate, Alfredo Muncada). The respondent Judge denied this motion on April 20, 1967. On the same day, Deananeas filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court “on questions of law alone” and a motion to fix the appeal bond. On April 22, 1967, the respondent Judge denied the motion to fix the bond and refused to give due course to the appeal, holding that Section 178 of the Revised Election Code does not provide for an appeal in a vice-mayoral election contest and that the decision had become final, and further stating the appeal involved questions of law and fact. Muncada then assumed office. Deananeas filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner has a right to appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Court of First Instance in an election contest involving the office of vice-mayor, and if so, whether the respondent Judge unlawfully excluded the petitioner from that right.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus. It held that while Section 178 of the Revised Election Code does not expressly mention appeals from decisions in vice-mayoral election contests, it is a settled rule that decisions of the Court of First Instance in election contests involving the office of vice-mayor (and municipal councilor) can be appealed to the Supreme Court on questions of law, as established in prior jurisprudence (Marquez v. Prodigalidad, Calano v. Cruz, Tumakay v. Orbiso, and Sarmiento v. Quemado). The petitioner filed his notice of appeal in due time, expressly stating it was on questions of law alone. It is not for the trial judge to determine or control the issues to be raised on appeal; that is for the Supreme Court to decide. The respondent Judge’s duty was to give due course to the appeal. Therefore, the respondent Judge (or whoever presides over the case) was ordered to give due course to the appeal and fix the appeal bond. The prayer for a preliminary injunction was not fully warranted.