G.R. No. L-27486 April 30, 1968
REBAR BUILDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and DESIDERIO LUCERO, respondents.

FACTS

Desiderio Lucero worked as a welder for Rebar Buildings, Inc. from November 1953 to April 6, 1958. His work involved welding steel frameworks in a hot, dusty, and dirty building, and he often had to manually lift heavy steel pieces. In 1958, while working, he spat blood. He reported this to company accountant Luis Magsalin and was later diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis by the Philippine Tuberculosis Society. He informed the company of the diagnosis, and upon Magsalin’s instructions, was given P120 for medical expenses and financial help. His subsequent request for lighter work was denied, and he was dismissed on April 6, 1958, due to his ailment. He filed a claim for disability compensation, medical expenses, and attorney’s fees on November 19, 1962. The hearing officer dismissed the claim for non-compliance with jurisdictional notice requirements and due to alleged inconsistencies in Lucero’s employment history. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) reversed this decision, finding the claim compensable and not time-barred, and ordered the company to pay compensation, provide medical services, and pay attorney’s fees. The company’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

1. Whether Lucero’s illness arose in the course of, and was aggravated by, his employment.
2. Whether Lucero’s claim was time-barred due to late filing and improper notice.
3. Whether the verbal notice of sickness was ineffective for not being in writing as required by law.

RULING

1. Yes, the illness arose in the course of and was aggravated by his employment. The Supreme Court applied the presumption under Section 44(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, that a claim comes within the Act’s provisions in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. The Court held that Lucero was physically fit when hired and worked continuously for five years, leading to the ineluctable conclusion that his tuberculosis was contracted during his employment. The company failed to provide substantial evidence to rebut this presumption.
2. No, the claim was not time-barred. The company had actual knowledge of Lucero’s illness when he reported it to Magsalin and when it provided financial assistance. This knowledge obligated the company to report the injury under Section 37 of the Act and to controvert the claim under Section 45 if it so desired. The company’s failure to do so resulted in a forfeiture of its right to contest the claim. The Court also found that Luis Magsalin was effectively an employee of the company, dismissing the argument that notice was given to an employee of a different entity.
3. No, the verbal notice was sufficient. A written notice under Section 25 of the Act was deemed unnecessary because the company, by providing P120 for medical expenses and financial help, had actual knowledge of the illness and disability, thereby complying with the purpose of the notice requirement.
The Supreme Court affirmed the WCC’s decision in toto.