G.R. No. L-27010 April 30, 1969
MARLENE DAUDEN-HERNAEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, HOLLYWOOD FAR EAST PRODUCTIONS, INC., and RAMON VALENZUELA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Marlene Dauden-Hernaez, a motion picture actress, filed a complaint against Hollywood Far East Productions, Inc., and its President and General Manager, Ramon Valenzuela, to recover P14,700.00 as balance for her services as leading actress in two motion pictures and to recover damages. The respondent court, upon motion of the defendants, ordered the complaint dismissed, primarily because the claim was not evidenced by any written document and the complaint was defective for allegedly violating Articles 1356 and 1358 of the Civil Code. The petitioner sought reconsideration and for admission of an amended complaint. The court denied reconsideration and leave to amend. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied for being pro forma and for not being accompanied by an affidavit of merits, and the court declared the dismissal final and unappealable. The petitioner then resorted to the Supreme Court via certiorari.

ISSUE

1. Whether the respondent court erred in dismissing the complaint without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend it.
2. Whether the second motion for reconsideration was pro forma and whether it interrupted the period for appeal.
3. Whether a contract for personal services involving more than P500.00 is invalid or unenforceable under Article 1358 of the Civil Code for not being in writing.

RULING

1. The Supreme Court held that it is a well-established rule that when a court sustains a demurrer or motion to dismiss, it is error to dismiss the complaint without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, unless the defect is incurable. The first order of dismissal was erroneous for not providing that it was without prejudice to amendment. This error was compounded when the motion to accept the amended complaint was denied. The petitioner was entitled to amend her complaint as of right because a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
2. The Court ruled that the second motion for reconsideration was not pro forma because it was addressed to the court’s refusal to allow an amendment to the original complaint, a ground not invoked in the first motion. As to the lack of three days’ notice, the respondents had filed their opposition in detail, so they were not deprived of any substantial right. Therefore, the claim that the first order of dismissal had become final and unappealable was overruled.
3. The Supreme Court held that the respondent court abused its discretion in ruling that a contract for personal services involving more than P500.00 was invalid or unenforceable under Article 1358. The Court clarified that under Articles 1315 and 1356 of the Civil Code, contracts are generally valid and binding from their perfection regardless of form, provided all essential requisites (consent, subject matter, and causa) are present. Article 1358, which requires that contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, does not provide that the absence of written form makes the agreement invalid or unenforceable. Article 1357 indicates that contracts covered by Article 1358 are binding and enforceable despite the absence of writing. The contract sued upon does not fall under the exceptions where the law requires a form for validity or enforceability (such as solemn contracts or those under the Statute of Frauds). Therefore, the complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to plead a written agreement.
The orders dismissing the complaint were set aside, and the case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs were imposed on the private respondents.