G.R. No. L-26969 December 19, 1984
CARPIO PHUA, TAN SIN TEE, PUA CHING TOO and PUA SHING SHING, petitioners-appellees, vs. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of the Bureau of Immigration, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

Tan Sin Tee and her two minor children arrived in the Philippines in 1961, documented as Filipino citizens based on certificates from the Philippine Consulate. Their admission was referred to a Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration. After investigation, the BSI admitted them as Filipino citizens, finding Tan Sin Tee to be the wife of alleged Filipino Carpio Phua and the minors their legitimate children. The decision was referred to the Board of Immigration Commissioners individually. One commissioner wrote “Exclude,” while two others wrote “Noted,” which constituted an affirmance. The Commissioners did not meet as a body.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Justice ordered a review of such admissions. A newly constituted Board of Commissioners, motu proprio, rendered a decision in 1962 excluding the petitioners. The Board cited doubts regarding Carpio Phua’s citizenship, the lack of his birth certificate, the implausibly close birthdates of the children, and insufficient proof of a valid marriage. It ordered exclusion under the Immigration Law. Before the warrant could be executed, Carpio Phua and the others filed an action for prohibition. The Court of First Instance of Manila declared the Commissioners’ decision void, finding a denial of due process, and made permanent an injunction against the exclusion warrant.

ISSUE

Whether the motu proprio review and subsequent exclusion order by the Board of Immigration Commissioners, without a new hearing for the petitioners, constituted a denial of due process of law.

RULING

No, there was no denial of due process. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision. The legal logic is anchored on the specific statutory framework governing immigration proceedings. The Immigration Law does not mandate that notice and a hearing be provided for the review by the Board of Commissioners of a BSI decision. The petitioners were already afforded a full opportunity to be heard and present their evidence during the initial investigation before the BSI. This prior hearing sufficiently satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process. The Board of Commissioners’ review power, including its motu proprio exercise, is a procedural step within the administrative process, and a de novo hearing is not a prerequisite. The Court cited precedents (Caoile vs. Vivo, Arocha vs. Vivo) which consistently hold that a hearing before the BSI complies with due process, and the Commissioners’ review does not necessitate a repeat of that proceeding. Therefore, the exclusion order was validly issued. The petition was dismissed, the injunction dissolved, and costs assessed against the petitioners.