GR L 26953; (March, 1969) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-26953 March 28, 1969
ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, petitioner-appellant, vs. DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, respondent-appellee.
FACTS
Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy, Joseph Casero, on February 4, 1961, at the Makabali Clinic owned by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, who assisted at the delivery. The child was Zenaida’s third with a married man, Feliciano Casero. From birth, the mother left the child with Dra. Makabali, who reared Joseph as her own son, treated him for poliomyelitis at her expense, and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child nor paid for his expenses. Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero and her two other children, with the tolerance of Casero’s lawful wife. Casero earned about P400.00 a month, and Zenaida earned P4-5 a day. The Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in habeas corpus proceedings for custody, called the minor, Joseph, to the witness stand. The boy, who never knew his mother and called the respondent “Mammy,” chose to stay with the respondent when asked by the court, stating, “She is the one rearing me.” After extracting a promise from Dra. Makabali to allow the minor a free choice at age 14, the court denied the writ, finding it for the child’s best interest to remain with his foster mother. The real mother appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the court erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus and awarding custody of the minor child to the foster mother instead of the biological mother.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the lower court. While the law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, the paramount principle under Article 363 of the Civil Code is that in all questions regarding the care, custody, education, and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount. The right of parents to custody is ancillary to their duty to provide adequate support, education, and training. The petitioner proved remiss in these duties, having deserted the child in his tenderest years without visits or support. Compelling the child to abandon the respondent’s care and love to live with his mother and witness her irregular living situation would not be to his advantage. The court found no abuse of discretion, as the appealed order was justified in fact and law, prioritizing the child’s best interest and welfare.