G.R. No. L-2695 May 28, 1951
Fermin Tabanda, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals and Tiburcio Rosal, respondents.

FACTS

In an election protest, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur sustained the election of respondent Tiburcio Rosal as mayor of San Vicente, Ilocos Sur, with a majority of three votes, and dismissed the protest of petitioner Fermin Tabanda. The trial court ordered the petitioner to pay one-half of the costs, considering the protest was not wholly unfounded as the original majority of twelve votes for Rosal was reduced to three upon judicial revision. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and declared petitioner Tabanda elected with a majority of seven votes, decreeing that each party shall bear his own expenses. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, praying that respondent Rosal be sentenced to pay the costs in both instances, or at least in the first instance, was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a resolution, clarified that each party shall bear their own expenses actually paid or incurred in the prosecution of their respective protest and counter-protest in the trial court and of their respective appeal. Petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari, alleging the Court of Appeals ignored the law or gravely abused its discretion in not taxing the costs against respondent Rosal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred or gravely abused its discretion in not assessing the costs in the election protest against the losing party, respondent Tiburcio Rosal, pursuant to Section 180 of the Revised Election Code, and whether Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on the discretionary allocation of costs is applicable to election cases.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari. It held that the Court of Appeals did not err or abuse its discretion. The Court ruled that Section 180 of the Revised Election Code, which authorizes the court to assess and collect expenses as costs from the losing party, does not deprive the court of its discretion under Section 1 of Rule 131 to order, for special reasons, that either party pay the costs or that they be divided as may be equitable. There is no inconsistency between the rule and the statutory provision; Section 180 merely grants the court the power to tax election protest expenses as costs, a power it would not otherwise have. The discretionary power to allocate costs, not being expressly taken away, applies to election cases and has salutary and equitable effects, allowing the court to consider the circumstances of each case. The Court cited the precedent in Mandac vs. Samonte, decided under a substantially similar provision of the old Election Law and the Code of Civil Procedure, where the Supreme Court ordered each party to pay his own costs. The Court found no cogent reason to deviate from this ruling, noting that election results can be sustained by very bare majorities and outright imposition of costs against a losing protestant or protestee may be unjust or discourage proper election contests.