G.R. Nos. L-26888-89 March 17, 1975
MILAGROS M. VDA. DE GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioners filed two claims with the Auditor General seeking payment for portions of their land allegedly taken by the Government for the widening of Uyanguren Street (now Magsaysay Avenue) in Davao City in 1953. They asserted the original street width was only 10 meters before 1953, and it was widened to 15 meters by taking 4,402.28 square meters from their properties. To support their claims, petitioners presented their Torrens titles, a map, affidavits from residents, and tax records showing they paid realty taxes on the disputed areas until 1953. They also cited a 1953 right-of-way document executed by other landowners with the Davao City Mayor.
In opposition, the City Appraisal Committee, City Engineer, Commissioner of Public Highways, and Undersecretary of Public Works maintained that Uyanguren Street had existed with a standard 15-meter width since its construction before 1918, long before the issuance of the petitioners’ original certificates of title in 1921. They presented official resolutions, indorsements, and pre-war plans indicating the street’s consistent width and alignment, and argued no widening occurred post-war. They further contended the claim had prescribed.

ISSUE

Whether the Auditor General’s finding that Uyanguren Street was 15 meters wide since its pre-1918 construction and was not widened in 1953 is supported by substantial evidence, thereby negating the petitioners’ claim for compensation.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Auditor General’s decision denying the claims. The Court held the Auditor General’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. Official documents, including pre-war plans and certifications from the City Engineer and Bureau of Public Highways, conclusively established that Uyanguren Street was constructed as a 15-meter wide national road before 1918 and retained that width. This existence predated the issuance of the petitioners’ original titles in 1921. Consequently, the petitioners’ titles, derived later, could not have included land already dedicated as a public thoroughfare. The Court found no flaw in these findings to warrant reversal. On the ancillary issue of prescription, the Court noted that while prescription does not run against a Torrens title, the street’s existence as a public road prior to the issuance of the original titles meant the disputed portions were never part of the land covered by the petitioners’ certificates. Therefore, no taking occurred for which compensation was due.