G.R. No. L-26737 July 31, 1969.
LAURA CORPUS, and the minors RICARDO, TERESITA and CORAZON, all surnamed MARCIA and represented by their mother LAURA CORPUS, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

On December 23, 1956, a Victory Liner bus driven by Felardo Paje collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia in Lubao, Pampanga, resulting in Marcia’s death and physical injuries to two others. An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. The heirs of Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action. On November 7, 1960, Paje was convicted. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1961, while Paje’s appeal was pending, Marcia’s heirs (his widow and minor children) filed a separate civil action for damages against Paje and Victory Liner in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On November 9, 1962, the Court of Appeals reversed Paje’s conviction and acquitted him, finding the collision was a pure accident and the reckless imprudence charged did not exist. The defendants moved to dismiss the civil action, arguing it was barred by the acquittal. The motion was initially denied. At pre-trial, the defendants argued the action, if based on a quasi-delict, had prescribed as it was filed four years and eleven months after the collision. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, finding the action was based on a quasi-delict. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the acquittal of Felardo Paje in the criminal action for reckless imprudence bars the separate civil action for damages based on the same act.
2. Whether the civil action for damages, if treated as based on a quasi-delict, had prescribed.

RULING

1. Yes, the acquittal bars the civil action. The acquittal by the Court of Appeals was on the ground that the reckless imprudence (criminal negligence) charged did not exist and the collision was a pure accident. Reckless imprudence is not one of the crimes (defamation, fraud, physical injuries) enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil Code that authorizes an independent civil action. Therefore, the general rule applies: the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal on the ground that the criminal act did not exist necessarily extinguishes the civil action for damages arising from the same act, even if the right to file a separate civil action was reserved. The civil action was based on the same criminal negligence of which Paje was acquitted.
2. Yes, the action based on quasi-delict had prescribed. Assuming arguendo that the action could be based on a quasi-delict, Article 1146 of the Civil Code requires such an action to be instituted within four years. The prescriptive period began to run from the date of the collision, December 23, 1956. The complaint was filed on November 21, 1961, which is four years and eleven months later. The institution of the criminal action did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for the quasi-delict action. Therefore, the action had prescribed.
The order of the lower court dismissing the complaint is affirmed.