G.R. No. L-26353 July 29, 1968
PERLA C. PACURSA, petitioner, vs. SIMEON DEL ROSARIO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (THIRD DIVISION), respondents.

FACTS

On February 7, 1957, The Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co., Inc. issued Master Accident Policy No. 7137 covering 24 members of the vaudeville troupe of Francisco del Rosario. On February 24, 1957, Francisco del Rosario and 21 members of his troupe died in an accident. Simeon del Rosario, father and heir of Francisco, sued Equitable to collect the proceeds of the policy in Civil Case No. 2419-P. On December 7, 1965, Perla C. Pacursa, claiming to be the sole heir of her husband and son who were among the deceased troupe members, filed a motion to intervene in the case “in her behalf and for others similarly situated.” The trial of the principal case had ended on December 8, 1965. The Court of First Instance of Rizal denied the motion to intervene on December 27, 1965, citing Section 2, Rule 12 of the New Rules of Court, as the hearing had already terminated. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s denial. Meanwhile, the trial court proceeded to render judgment on the merits in favor of Simeon del Rosario on November 8, 1966. Equitable’s appeal from this judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and its petition for review to the Supreme Court was initially denied.

ISSUE

Did the Court of First Instance of Rizal abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the intervention of Perla C. Pacursa in Civil Case No. 2419-P?

RULING

No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for intervention. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing Pacursa’s petition. The denial was justified on three grounds: First, petitioner was guilty of laches for seeking intervention only in December 1965, over eight years after the accident (February 24, 1957), over two years after Simeon del Rosario filed his suit (September 6, 1963), and only after the trial had concluded. This delay was inexcusable and would work injustice. Second, allowing intervention would unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. Petitioner’s intervention was not just for herself but for 19 others, requiring proof that Francisco del Rosario predeceased each of them, a time-consuming and expensive task that would substantially prejudice Simeon del Rosario. Third, the trial court was powerless to grant intervention as it had already lost jurisdiction over the principal case after rendering judgment on the merits on November 8, 1966. Intervention is ancillary to an existing litigation, and there was no longer a principal proceeding in the trial court in which to intervene.