G.R. No. L-2610 June 16, 1951
CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners, vs. ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE LOPEZ, respondents.

FACTS

On August 31, 1933, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Ceferina, Jose, and Geronimo, all surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney authorizing their brother Eladio Ramos to encumber, mortgage, and transfer a parcel of land in Bayambang, Pangasinan. On August 9, 1934, Eladio Ramos, using this authority, mortgaged the said property along with another parcel to Romualdo Rivera to secure a loan of P300 with 12% annual interest. Upon Eladio Ramos’s failure to pay, Romualdo Rivera filed a foreclosure action (Civil Case No. 7668) against the petitioners (the Ramos siblings). Summons was served only on Eladio Ramos, who acknowledged it for himself and his siblings. Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez entered his appearance for all defendants and submitted an answer on their behalf. After trial, the court rendered a decision on August 24, 1939, ordering Eladio Ramos to pay the debt with interest and attorney’s fees, and decreeing the foreclosure of the mortgage if payment was not made within 90 days after the decision became final. Eladio Ramos failed to pay. The properties were sold at public auction to Romualdo Rivera, and the sale was confirmed by the court on April 1, 1941. On August 21, 1947, Romualdo Rivera sold the properties to Felipe Lopez, who filed a motion to be placed in possession. The court granted the motion on September 22, 1947. When petitioners refused to comply, they were summoned to explain why they should not be punished for contempt. They argued the writ of possession was issued after more than five years (implying it was time-barred) and that the foreclosure sale was illegal due to improper service of summons. The court found their explanation unsatisfactory and threatened contempt. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking to annul the 1939 decision and the 1947 order.

ISSUE

1. Whether the decision rendered on August 24, 1939, in the foreclosure case (Civil Case No. 7668) is valid.
2. Whether the order dated September 22, 1947, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Felipe Lopez is valid.

RULING

1. On the validity of the 1939 decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners’ challenge to the 1939 decision is a collateral attack on a judgment that is valid and regular on its face and has long become final. A judgment valid on its face can only be attacked in a separate action brought principally for that purpose. Even assuming improper service of summons, the defect was cured when Attorney Lauro C. Maiquez voluntarily appeared and answered the complaint on behalf of all defendants, including petitioners. The attorney is presumed to have been authorized, and the security of judicial proceedings requires upholding this presumption. The challenge, raised more than nine years after the judgment, is untenable.
2. On the validity of the 1947 writ of possession: The Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It is a ministerial and complementary duty of the court that can be undertaken even after five years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened. The court retains jurisdiction to put the purchaser in possession to avoid multiplicity of actions and vexatious litigation. The confirmation of the sale operates to divest the parties of their rights and vest them in the purchaser, making it the court’s duty to issue the writ.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: The petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioners.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Pablo concurred, stating that certiorari is not the proper remedy because petitioners could have appealed the contempt order. Certiorari is only available when a court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and no plain, speedy, and adequate appeal is available.
Justice Tuason dissented, arguing that the petitioners’ refusal to vacate the land did not constitute contempt. The order to deliver possession was directed at the sheriff, not the petitioners, and disobedience to a sheriff’s order, as opposed to a direct judicial order, is not punishable as contempt. Furthermore, the judgment did not impose a direct duty on the petitioners to deliver the property.