G.R. No. L-26055; April 29, 1968
FELIPE SUNGA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. ARSENIO H. LACSON, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

FACTS

On November 11, 1948, petitioners-appellants Felipe Sunga, et al., filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila to prevent respondents-appellees (the Mayor and City Engineer of Manila) from demolishing their houses along Estero de Vitas in Tondo, Manila. The court ordered summons to be served upon payment of sheriff’s fees by the appellants. On November 24, 1958, the court ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction upon the appellants’ filing of a P1,000 bond approved by the court. The appellants failed to comply with both orders: they did not pay the sheriff’s fees (preventing service of summons) and, although they filed a bond, they never sought court approval. Consequently, four months after filing, no summons or injunction had been served. On March 20, 1959, the appellees filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Although no copy of the motion was served on the appellants, the court notified them of a hearing set for June 13, 1959. On that date, the court dismissed the case. The appellants’ motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal, which was certified to the Supreme Court as it involves a pure question of law.

ISSUE

1. Whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the appellees despite lack of formal service of summons.
2. Whether a defendant may move for dismissal of an action before filing an answer, particularly when the plaintiff has failed to prosecute.
3. Whether the appellees’ motion to dismiss was valid despite initial lack of notice to the appellants.

RULING

1. Yes, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the appellees. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant may be acquired not only by service of summons but also by voluntary appearance. The appellees voluntarily appeared in court on November 17, 1958, when they were required to file a memorandum during the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Furthermore, their filing of a motion to dismiss constituted a voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. The appellants’ failure to pay sheriff’s fees, which prevented service of summons, cannot negate this voluntary appearance.
2. Yes, a defendant may move for dismissal before filing an answer. The appellants argued that under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only a plaintiff may dismiss an action before the defendant answers. The Supreme Court rejected this, stating that Rule 17, Section 1 merely outlines the conditions under which a plaintiff may dismiss an action unilaterally; it does not strip a defendant of the right to seek dismissal for the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. To hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff to perpetuate an action indefinitely through their own neglect.
3. Yes, the motion to dismiss was valid. The appellants cited Manakil v. Revilla to argue that the motion was a “useless piece of paper” due to lack of notice. However, in this case, when the court discovered the lack of notice, it reset the hearing for June 13, 1959, with due notice to all parties. This cured the initial defect, rendering the motion proper for judicial consideration. Unlike in Manakil, where the motion remained defective, here the court rectified the procedural lapse.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs against the appellants.