G.R. No. L-26002 October 31, 1969
ABELARDO BAUTISTA and ROBERTO TAN TING, petitioners-appellees, vs. FEDERICO O. BORROMEO, INC., HONORABLE CESAR C. CRUZ, Judge of the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal and JESUS BAUTISTA, Deputy Sheriff of Manila as Special Sheriff, respondents-appellants.

FACTS

On September 15, 1964, a Ford truck driven by petitioner Abelardo Bautista and owned by petitioner Roberto Tan Ting collided with a Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by respondent Federico O. Borromeo, Inc. (Borromeo). Quintin Delgado, a helper in Borromeo’s truck, died from injuries sustained in the accident. Borromeo paid Delgado’s widow P4,444 as death benefit and funeral expenses under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. On June 17, 1965, Borromeo sued petitioners in the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, to recover the amount paid, alleging the accident was caused by petitioners’ negligence. At the hearing on July 23, 1965, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear. The court allowed Borromeo to present evidence ex parte and rendered judgment the same day, ordering petitioners to pay Borromeo P4,444, P500 attorney’s fees, and costs. Petitioners received a copy of the decision on August 6, 1965. They filed a motion to set aside the decision on August 13, 1965, which was denied on August 14, 1965. Their counsel learned of the denial on September 2, 1965. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal dated September 2, 1965, but paid the appellate docket fee and deposited the cash appeal bond only on September 28, 1965, which was beyond the reglementary period, leading the municipal court to reject their appeal. On October 26, 1965, petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, claiming excusable negligence for their counsel’s failure to attend the hearing and asserting a good defense based on lack of contractual relationship with Borromeo. The lower court granted the petition, set aside the municipal court’s decision, and ordered a new trial. Respondents appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was available to petitioners.
2. Whether petitioners’ counsel’s failure to attend the hearing constituted excusable negligence.
3. Whether petitioners had a meritorious defense based on the lack of contractual relationship with Borromeo.

RULING

1. The petition for relief from judgment was unavailable to petitioners. A petition for relief under Rule 38 is not a substitute for appeal. Petitioners learned of the judgment on August 6, 1965, and of the denial of their motion to set aside on September 2, 1965. They could have appealed but failed to perfect their appeal on time by paying the docket fee and depositing the bond only on September 28, 1965, which was eleven days late. Their failure to appeal seasonably was their own fault. Furthermore, their petition for relief filed on October 26, 1965, was beyond the sixty-day period from August 6, 1965, as required by Section 3, Rule 38.
2. Petitioners failed to establish excusable negligence. Their counsel, Atty. Leopoldo V. Repotente, Jr., failed to attend the hearing because he relied on his associate, Atty. Lucenito N. Tagle, to handle it, as he had another case in Quezon City. Atty. Tagle failed to attend because the case record was misplaced during his office transfer. The Court found this negligence inexcusable. Atty. Repotente had agreed to the hearing date in open court and should not have scheduled another hearing on the same day. He also failed to notify his clients. Atty. Tagle’s excuse of a misplaced record was a stereotyped excuse; he should have attended the hearing and requested a postponement.
3. Petitioners’ defense on the merits must fail. Borromeo’s cause of action did not require a contractual relationship with petitioners. Under Section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, when an employer pays compensation to an employee for injuries caused by a third party, the employer is subrogated to the rights of the employee against the tortfeasor. Thus, Borromeo, as subrogee of its deceased employee Quintin Delgado, had the right to sue petitioners for the amount it paid. The cause of action arises from quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, not from contract.
The Supreme Court REVERSED the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and DISMISSED the petition for relief. Costs were awarded against petitioners-appellees.