GR L 2600; (March, 1906) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-2600
FACTS:
The defendant-appellant, Major Frank de L. Carrington of the U.S. Army, was the designated disbursing officer for funds appropriated for the Louisiana Purchase Exposition. He was charged with the crime of falsification of a public document. The information alleged that on or about February 12, 1904, in Manila, he falsified a General Expense Voucher (Form Auditor 125) by certifying therein that on January 10, 1904, he purchased 2,750 feet of hardwood lumber from Charles A. Jollie for P770 and had paid said amount, when in truth and in fact no such purchase or payment was made. After his motion to make the information more definite and his demurrer were denied, he was tried, found guilty by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and sentenced to twelve years and one day of imprisonment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the defendant acted as a public functionary when he performed the acts alleged in the information.
2. Whether the General Expense Voucher he falsified is a public document.
3. Whether the defendant is guilty of falsifying said document.
RULING:
1. Yes, the defendant acted as a public functionary. His appointment as disbursing officer for the Exposition funds by virtue of a resolution of the Philippine Commission, approved by the Civil Governor, and his subsequent performance of the duties of that office, constituted him a public official exercising public functions.
2. Yes, the General Expense Voucher is a public document. The voucher was an official form prescribed by the Auditor General under statutory authority for the accounting of public funds by disbursing officers. As such, it falls within the definition of a public document under Article 1216 of the Civil Code.
3. Yes, the defendant is guilty of falsification of a public document by a public official. The evidence conclusively established that the certified transaction with Charles A. Jollie for lumber never occurred. By making untruthful statements in a public document in the course of his official duties, he committed the crime defined and penalized under Article 300 of the Penal Code.
The Supreme Court modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. Applying the medium period of cadena temporal as no aggravating or extenuating circumstances were present, the defendant was sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of cadena temporal, a fine of 1,250 pesetas, and costs.
