G.R. No. L-25966 December 28, 1979
Fermin A. Bagadiong, petitioner, vs. Hon. Feliciano S. Gonzales, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes, Clemente Abundo, Rafael Villaluna and Francisco A. Perfecto, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Fermin A. Bagadiong, the Provincial Treasurer of Catanduanes, was among the defendants in a civil case for prohibition with injunction filed by respondents Clemente Abundo and Rafael Villaluna. The suit sought to restrain provincial officials from disbursing funds under the 1965-1966 provincial budget, which plaintiffs alleged was approved via a falsified resolution. Respondent Judge issued a preliminary injunction. Respondent Francisco A. Perfecto later intervened, seeking a declaration of the budget’s nullity and demanding refunds and damages.
During the trial, plaintiffs’ counsel called petitioner to the witness stand as their witness. Petitioner’s counsel objected, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination, arguing that his testimony could expose him to criminal liability. The respondent Judge overruled the objection, citing that the privilege was premature and inapplicable at the mere calling of a witness, and ordered petitioner to testify.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction by compelling petitioner, a party-defendant in a civil case, to take the witness stand for the adverse party over his claim of the right against self-incrimination.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the respondent Judge’s order. The Court clarified that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is not a blanket right to refuse to take the witness stand. It is a right that must be invoked specifically when an incriminating question is asked, not beforehand. The Rules of Court, specifically Section 6, Rule 132, expressly permit a party to call an adverse party to testify. Since this was a civil action, petitioner was compellable to take the stand as a witness for the plaintiffs.
The legal logic is grounded in the distinction between being compelled to testify and being compelled to give incriminating testimony. The privilege protects against the latter, not the former. A witness must appear, be sworn, and may only invoke the privilege in response to specific questions that would elicit self-incriminating answers. To rule otherwise would allow a party to preemptively avoid testimony altogether, undermining the truth-seeking function of trials. The Court cited precedent, including Gonzales v. Chavez, which established that the claim of privilege is timely only when a question calling for a criminating answer is propounded. Therefore, the respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, and petitioner’s remedy is to invoke the privilege appropriately during the examination.