G.R. No. L-25618 March 28, 1969
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service, and ALIPIO BUENAVENTURA, as Executive Director, Civil Service Commission, petitioners, vs. HON. SIMEON GOPENGCO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila and FAUSTO VARELA, respondents.

FACTS

Fausto Varela was the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Service when he was suspended by the President on February 21, 1962, on administrative charges. After his suspension was lifted, he was detailed to various positions of lower rank. On November 11, 1965, Varela filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging his reassignments constituted demotion and removal without cause and due process. The court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on November 18, 1965, directing his reinstatement as Deputy Commissioner. On December 21, 1965, the President issued Administrative Order 171, finding Varela guilty and considering him resigned from the service. The petitioners moved to dissolve the injunction, arguing the case had become moot. The lower court, on January 4, 1966, instead enjoined the enforcement of the President’s order. The petitioners then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the lower court’s orders and the writ of injunction.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila gravely abused its discretion in issuing and refusing to dissolve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction reinstating Fausto Varela to his position as Deputy Civil Service Commissioner.

RULING

Yes, the lower court gravely abused its discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the challenged orders and writ.
First, the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction was improper. Varela failed to show a clear legal right to restoration and an urgent need for such relief. His detail to other offices was temporary, he continued to receive his salary as Deputy Commissioner, and he waited over three years from his reinstatement to the service in 1962 before filing his court action in 1965, negating any urgency. The applicable Civil Service Act provisions did not mandate restoration to his specific position pending the administrative case’s resolution.
Second, the lower court should have dissolved the injunction after the promulgation of Administrative Order 171. The President’s order constituted a supervening event that rendered the basis for the injunction—the claim of illegal removal—no longer tenable. While the order was not yet final due to a pending motion for reconsideration, such administrative decisions may be executed pending finality to safeguard public interest, without prejudice to reinstatement with backpay if the employee is later exonerated.