G.R. No. L-25577 March 15, 1966
ONOFRE P. GUEVARA, petitioner, vs. RAOUL M. INOCENTES, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Onofre P. Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965, and he took his oath of office on November 25, 1965. The incumbent Executive, on January 23, 1966, issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 declaring all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive as having lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966, and extended an ad interim appointment for the same position to respondent Raoul M. Inocentes. Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto, seeking to be declared the person legally entitled to the office of Undersecretary of Labor. Petitioner argued that his ad interim appointment remained valid and permanent until either express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or the adjournment of the regular session of Congress in 1966, and that no Commission on Appointments was constituted during the special session. Respondent contended that petitioner’s appointment lapsed when Congress adjourned its last special session, that such appointments cease to be valid after each term of Congress, and that the appointment was contrary to public policy and void under existing doctrine.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner’s ad interim appointment lapsed upon the adjournment of the special session of Congress on January 22, 1966.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the ad interim appointment extended to petitioner on November 18, 1965, lapsed when the special session of Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The Court held that under Article VII, Section 10(4) of the Constitution, an ad interim appointment is effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. These are two separate and independent modes of termination. The adjournment of Congress, whether in regular or special session, constitutes the “next adjournment” contemplated by the Constitution. The Court rejected petitioner’s theory that the adjournment must be of a regular session during which the Commission on Appointments could be organized, stating that such an interpretation could lead to an anomaly where appointments would never face legislative scrutiny if the Commission were not organized. The adjournment of the Senate sine die at midnight on January 22, 1966, legally constituted the adjournment of Congress, notwithstanding the House’s earlier suspension of its session, as Congress cannot be in session if one house has adjourned. Therefore, petitioner’s appointment was terminated by constitutional operation upon that adjournment.