GR L 25290; (March, 1966) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-25290 March 18, 1966.
SOTERA VIRAY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GREGORIO LEGASPI and HEIRS OF CEZARIA MERENDO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Sotera Viray received notice on October 25, 1965, that her motion for reconsideration of an adverse Court of Appeals decision was denied. The reglementary 15-day period to appeal to the Supreme Court would have expired on November 9, 1965. The Supreme Court granted her an extension of 15 days from the expiration of that reglementary period. The petition for certiorari was filed on November 26, 1965. The Supreme Court, by a Resolution dated February 8, 1966, dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time, as the period to file expired on November 24, 1965. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that November 9 (Election Day, a holiday) should be excluded, making the original period end on November 10, and the 15-day extension should thus be counted from November 10, ending on November 25, which was Thanksgiving Day (a holiday), thereby allowing her to file on the next day, November 26.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for certiorari was filed on time, considering the claimed exclusion of holidays from the computation of the reglementary and extended periods for filing.
RULING
No, the petition was filed out of time. The motion for reconsideration is denied. The extension of 15 days granted to the petitioner, tacked to the original 15-day period, effectively gave her a 30-day period from October 25, 1965, within which to file her petition. Since October has 31 days, the last day was November 24, 1965, not November 26. The rule excluding the last day of a period if it is a holiday applies only to the performance of an act prescribed or required on that last day. It does not apply where, at the end of the period, no such act is to be done. Here, there was nothing to be done on the last day (November 24), so the holiday rule for exclusion does not apply. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found no merit in the substance of the petition itself, as the trial court’s refusal to admit an amended answer did not constitute grave abuse of discretion, given the lack of an adequate excuse for the delay and the fact that the new theory involved an unauthorized abandonment of a certificate of public convenience, which is a violation of law.