G.R. No. L-25239 November 18, 1967
EMERITO S. CALDERON, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ, as Presiding Judge of the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Emerito S. Calderon, a congressional candidate, together with others, filed a verified petition for injunction with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 241-BC) on September 10, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VII). The petition sought to enjoin the commencement and prosecution of public works and highway projects in the 5th and 6th congressional districts of Cebu, alleging they were illegal and violated election laws and regulations. It also sought to stop disbursements of public funds for these projects. The court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on September 16, 1965, after the petitioners posted a bond. The writ commanded respondents to desist from commencing, undertaking, or prosecuting the projects and from making, causing, or authorizing payment of any payroll or voucher in connection with them. Subsequently, on October 16, 1965, petitioner filed a petition for contempt against certain officials for allegedly violating the injunction by continuing to recruit laborers and authorize payments. On October 30, 1965, laborers who had worked on the projects filed a verified petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case No. R-9053) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch II), presided by respondent Judge Amador E. Gomez, seeking to compel the provincial treasurer and auditor to pay their wages for the period September 8 to 16, 1965. Calderon then instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the cognizance by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch II) of the mandamus suit (Civil Case No. R-9053) constitutes undue interference with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by another court of co-equal and coordinate jurisdiction (Court of First Instance, Branch VII).

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the writ prayed for and made the temporary restraining order permanent. The Court held that the cognizance of the mandamus case by Branch II constituted undue interference with the writ of preliminary injunction issued by Branch VII. The writ of preliminary injunction from Branch VII specifically prohibited the payment of any payroll or voucher in connection with the questioned projects. The mandamus suit before Branch II sought to compel the very same payments that were enjoined. Allowing Branch II to proceed would effectively set aside the writ of preliminary injunction from a coordinate court. The Court cited the settled principle that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. This principle applies with equal logic to other provisional remedies, like mandamus, to avoid confusion and hindrance in the administration of justice. The Court also rejected the argument that the case had become moot and academic after the 1965 elections, as the issue of the alleged illegal and padded disbursement of public funds remained a vital dispute in the original injunction case (Civil Case No. 241-B).