G.R. No. L-25031 September 25, 1968
ISIDORO GEVEROLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Isidoro Geverola was accused of Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents in Criminal Case No. 8219 before the Court of First Instance of Davao. He had been released on a P32,000.00 bail and pleaded not guilty. The trial was set for August 23, 24, and 25, 1965. On the morning of August 23, 1965, his counsel, Atty. Primo L. Ocampo, orally moved for postponement, submitting a sworn medical certificate from Dr. Eugenio Claveria stating that Geverola was under treatment since August 20, 1965, for “Influenza, with Chronic Cough” and was physically incapable of attending trial. The distance between Geverola’s residence in Malita and the court in Davao City is 125 kilometers of rough road. Without resolving the motion for postponement and without objection from the fiscal, the respondent judge dictated an order in open court for the arrest of the accused and forfeiture of the bond, stating a hearing on the motion would be held with the doctor testifying. However, no hearing was held that day. A written order dated August 23, 1965, was subsequently issued, declaring the bail forfeited and ordering the accused’s immediate arrest for his failure to appear. A motion for reconsideration filed by the accused was denied in an order dated August 28, 1965, wherein the judge stated that had counsel pressed for a resolution, the motion would have been denied because the medical certificate did not comply with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside the orders.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders for the immediate arrest of the accused and the confiscation of his bail without first resolving the motion for postponement.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ and set aside the orders. The Court held that the respondent judge acted with gross abuse of discretion. The granting or denial of a motion for postponement is discretionary, but such discretion must be sound and reasonable, not arbitrary. Here, the postponement was the first sought by the accused; the illness appeared serious; the distance to court was considerable; the fiscal did not object; and the medical certificate was sworn before a municipal judge with its truth not traversed. Under these circumstances, it was prudent to give the defense a reasonable opportunity. More critically, the court failed in its duty to first resolve the motion for postponement before ordering the arrest and bail forfeiture. This denial of an opportunity for the movant to seek proper remedies violated due process. The Court cited precedent that courts must act on motions with sufficient dispatch to allow parties to avail of remedies, as implied in the mandate that justice be administered without unnecessary delay.