GR L 24982; (March, 1969) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-24982 March 28, 1969
BERNARDINA FLORENDO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONIFACIA FLORENDO, DOROTEA FLORENDO and RUFINA FLORENTO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS
An ejectment suit was filed on September 15, 1962. The lower court issued an order setting the case for hearing on the merits. A copy of this order was sent to the house of the then counsel of record for the defendants-appellants, but the envelope was returned with a notation that it was unclaimed. On the hearing date of August 27, 1964, the lower court allowed the plaintiff-appellee to present her first witness in the absence of the defendants-appellants. After one witness testified, the continuation of the hearing was set for October 21, 1964, upon the plaintiff-appellee’s motion. A notice for this subsequent hearing was again sent to the same attorney for the defendants-appellants with the same result of being returned unclaimed. The lower court, believing the failure to claim the mail was willful, allowed the plaintiff-appellee to proceed with the trial and present further evidence on October 21, 1964. A decision was rendered on October 31, 1964 in favor of the plaintiff-appellee. The defendants-appellants filed a motion for reconsideration on November 17, 1964, seeking an opportunity to present their evidence and alleging there was no willful failure of their counsel to receive his mail. This motion was denied by an order dated January 5, 1965. The defendants-appellants, through new counsel, then filed a petition for relief from judgment. They asserted they were never notified of the hearings because their then counsel was in Manila attending a seminar preparatory to assuming office as an election registrar, and while persons at his house received the notices, he was not informed. They claimed this constituted “excusable negligence” and that upon their counsel’s acceptance of the election registrar position, they automatically lost his services as he was prohibited from practicing. The lower court denied this petition on March 19, 1965.
ISSUE
Whether the defendants-appellants were denied procedural due process, specifically their right to be heard, justifying relief from judgment.
RULING
No. The defendants-appellants were not denied procedural due process. The lower court fulfilled its duty by sending notices of the hearings to their counsel of record at his address. The petition for relief admitted the registry notices were delivered to the counsel’s house and received by persons present. The fault lay with the defendants-appellants and their counsel for failing to act with due prudence and diligence in inquiring about the status of their case. Furthermore, the petition for relief failed to indicate that a meritorious defense could be interposed if a rehearing were granted, as it merely alleged possession based on an “honest belief” of entitlement without asserting any substantive right to the land. The denial of the petition for relief was therefore in accordance with law and the interest of justice. The decision of October 31, 1964, and the order of March 19, 1965, are affirmed.
