G.R. No. L-24693 October 23, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR, INC. and GO HIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE, CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

FACTS

Petitioners, an association of hotel and motel operators and individual operators, challenged the validity of a Manila City ordinance. The ordinance aimed to minimize practices hurtful to public morals, such as prostitution, adultery, and fornication, which were allegedly facilitated by motels providing privacy for clandestine activities. The ordinance required guests to fill out registration forms in a lobby open to public view and increased license fees to discourage illegal operations and increase city income. The lower court declared the ordinance void. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal, which reversed the lower court’s decision in a ruling dated July 31, 1967. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for New Trial of that decision.

ISSUE

The primary issue in the Motion for Reconsideration is whether the Supreme Court correctly applied the presumption of constitutionality to the challenged ordinance and reversed the lower court’s decision declaring it void, in the absence of factual evidence presented by petitioners to rebut that presumption.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for New Trial. The Court held that its original decision was correct. The basis for the reversal of the lower court’s decision was the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. The Court emphasized that unless a statute or ordinance is void on its face, which was not the case here, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of a factual foundation of record for overthrowing it. Petitioners, having decided the case on pleadings and a stipulation of facts, failed to lay such a factual foundation. The Court further found that on its face, the ordinance was not repugnant to the due process clause, as it was a valid police power measure aimed at safeguarding public morals. The Court rejected petitioners’ additional claims of infringement of rights against unreasonable search and seizure, liberty, and property, noting they lacked standing or merit. The explanatory note of the ordinance, included in the stipulation of facts, supported its validity by outlining the public moral concerns it sought to address.