G.R. No. L-24447 June 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WILLY OBSANIA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On November 22, 1964, a complaint for rape with robbery was filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan, by Erlinda Dollente and her parents against Willy Obsania, alleging that on November 21, 1964, the accused, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously had carnal knowledge of complainant Erlinda Dollente against her will. The robbery charge was later deleted during the preliminary investigation. The case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, where the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape, embodying the complaint’s allegations and adding that the offense was committed “with lewd designs.” The accused pleaded not guilty and immediately moved to dismiss the case, contending the original complaint was fatally defective for failing to allege “lewd designs,” and that the subsequent information did not cure this jurisdictional infirmity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action, ruling that the failure to allege “lewd designs” deprived it of jurisdiction. The prosecution appealed.

ISSUE

1. Are “lewd designs” an indispensable element that must be alleged in a complaint for rape?
2. Does the present appeal by the prosecution place the accused in double jeopardy?

RULING

1. No. In a complaint for rape, it is not necessary to allege “lewd design” or “unchaste motive.” Such a requirement would be a patent superfluity because lascivious intent inheres in rape; the unchaste design is manifest in the very act of carnal knowledge through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or unconscious, or is under twelve years of age. The complaint here, which unmistakably alleges carnal knowledge by means of violence and intimidation, satisfies the requirements of legal sufficiency for an indictment for rape. The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the complaint was defective for lacking this allegation and that such infirmity affected the court’s jurisdiction. The error was in confusing the concept of jurisdiction with that of insufficiency in substance of an indictment.
2. No. The appeal by the prosecution does not place the accused in double jeopardy. For the protection against double jeopardy to apply, the dismissal of the case must have been without the express consent of the accused. Here, the dismissal was ordered by the trial court upon the motion of the accused. The doctrines of waiver and estoppel apply where: (a) the dismissal is sought or induced by the defendant personally or through counsel, and (b) such dismissal is not on the merits and does not necessarily amount to an acquittal. The dismissal in this case was predicated on the accused’s erroneous contention about a defective complaint and jurisdictional infirmity, not on the merits or as an acquittal (e.g., failure to prosecute). Therefore, the accused, having moved for the dismissal, is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy and is estopped from claiming such defense on appeal. The order of dismissal is set aside, and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.