GR L 24384; (September, 1967) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-24384 September 28, 1967
Margarita Iñigo, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Estate of Adriana Maloto, Gregorio L. Lira, Special Administrator, defendant and appellee.
FACTS
On March 29, 1963, pursuant to a previous verbal understanding, plaintiff Margarita Iñigo paid Adriana Maloto P10,000.00 as the purchase price for a house and lot in Iloilo City. The deed of sale was to be executed later. Plaintiff did not demand a receipt due to their “almost filial relationship” (plaintiff being a niece of Adriana’s deceased husband) and because Adriana referred the matter of preparing the receipt and deed to her lawyer, Atty. Sulpicio Palma. Plaintiff began exercising ownership by improving the property and constructing a retail store. In September and October 1963, at Adriana’s instruction, plaintiff attempted to see Atty. Palma for the deed but was unsuccessful as he was campaigning. Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963. The Torrens title was later transferred to the defendants (Adriana’s nephews and niece) after estate settlement. Defendants rejected plaintiff’s formal demand to execute a deed of sale. Plaintiff filed suit to compel execution. The lower court dismissed the complaint, ruling the claim was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
ISSUE
Whether the verbal contract for the sale of real property is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
RULING
No. The order of dismissal is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The Statute of Frauds (Article 1403(2)(e) of the Civil Code) applies only to executory contracts, not to contracts either totally or partially performed. The complaint alleges a consummated contract: the sale was agreed upon, the purchase price was paid, and plaintiff performed acts of ownership. Oral evidence of such a consummated sale is not barred by the Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, a prior ejectment case decided in favor of the defendants is no bar to this suit contesting ownership. An ejectment action does not bar a case contesting ownership, and the city court in the ejectment case lost jurisdiction once the issue of ownership became apparent, making its judgment on possession not decisive of the ownership question properly before the Court of First Instance.