G.R. No. L-24266 January 24, 1969
AMPARO D. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL H. MOJICA, EMMA R. GENIZA, AURELIO GENIZA, CATALINA CARREON-RIVERA, ZACARIAS RIVERA, LORENZO RIVERA, THE SHERIFF OF MANILA and THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Amparo D. Santos was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2043-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, along with Roque M. Garcia and Miguel Moreno. The plaintiffs (private respondents) were Emma R. Geniza, Aurelio Geniza, Catalina Carreon-Rivera, Zacarias Rivera, and Lorenzo Rivera. On April 30, 1964, a decision was rendered sentencing the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs various sums totaling over P400,000, including principal, interest, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-24071). Pending appeal, the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate execution on the ground that the appeal was dilatory. Respondent Judge Angel H. Mojica granted the motion on November 19, 1964, ordering execution unless the defendants filed a supersedeas bond within ten days. No bond was filed, and a writ of execution was issued on January 12, 1965. Levies and garnishments were made on petitioner’s properties and salary. Petitioner filed the present action for certiorari to annul the order of execution and the writ, and to restrain their enforcement, arguing that the judge gravely abused his discretion.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Judge Angel H. Mojica exceeded his jurisdiction or gravely abused his discretion in ordering the execution of the decision pending appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and dissolved the preliminary injunction. The Court held that the issuance of execution pending appeal is primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and no grave abuse of discretion was committed. The Court found sufficient grounds for execution pending appeal: (1) petitioner’s co-defendants appeared to have no property to satisfy the judgment, and petitioner herself was in imminent danger of insolvency as her only significant property was heavily mortgaged; (2) other levied properties were subject to third-party claims; (3) petitioner had a plain and adequate remedy by filing a supersedeas bond but failed to do so; and (4) the trial court found the appeal to have been taken for delay, a conclusion supported by the record regarding the fraudulent acts for which damages were awarded. Arguments on the merits of the main case were deemed improper for the certiorari proceeding.