G.R. No. L-24157 September 28, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ABDUGAFAR ABUBAKAR, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The accused, Abdugafar Abubakar, a public school teacher and Chairman of the Board of Inspectors for an electoral precinct in Sulu, was initially charged under the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180). The information alleged that on election day in 1961, he took advantage of his official position to sign the name and affix the thumbmark of an absent registered voter, Ambiting Sahibil, in the list of voters, filled out a ballot, and cast it, making it appear Sahibil voted when he did not. This first case (Criminal Case No. 2597) was dismissed upon the prosecuting fiscal’s ex-parte motion before the court’s preliminary investigation was concluded.
Subsequently, a second information was filed (Criminal Case No. 2674) based on identical factual allegations but now specifically charging the accused with Falsification by a Public Officer under Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused filed a motion to quash this second information. The Court of First Instance of Sulu granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the act constituted an election offense punishable exclusively under the Revised Election Code, and therefore could not be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE

Whether the court a quo erred in dismissing the information for Falsification under the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the alleged acts constitute an election offense punishable solely under the Revised Election Code.

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal order and reinstated the criminal case. The legal logic is anchored on the principle that a single act may constitute two distinct offenses if the elements required by each law are present. The information clearly alleges facts constituting the crime of Falsification by a Public Officer under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: that the accused was a public officer; that he took advantage of his official position; and that he falsified a document by causing it to appear that a person participated in a proceeding (voting) when he did not. These elements are sufficiently pleaded independently of any election law violation.
The Court clarified that Section 186 of the Revised Election Code, which states that election offenses may be prosecuted under either the Election Code or “under the provisions of the penal laws,” is not an exclusive provision but a cumulative one. It allows prosecution under the general penal laws when the acts also fall within their definitions. The dismissal of the first information under the Election Code did not constitute double jeopardy, as it was dismissed before the accused had pleaded, and it involved a different offense defined by a different law. The rule that the recital of facts in the information, not the specification of the law violated, determines the nature of the offense charged supports the validity of the second information. Since the Revised Penal Code explicitly punishes the act of falsification committed by a public officer, that law must be enforced.