G.R. No. 24 ; February 6, 1946
EL PUEBLO DE LAS ISLAS FILIPINAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE LUNA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On the morning of March 29, 1945, Manuel Eloriaga, while looking for Captain Yangson, met Mariano Josue on Oroquieta Street, Manila. Eloriaga questioned Josue about Japanese airplanes. Josue went to a carinderia (eatery) at the corner of Oroquieta Street No. 1724 and an unnamed alley. Eloriaga followed him there and, upon finding the accused Felipe Luna (the proprietor), warned him about Josue being a Japanese spy. The accused responded, “I have nothing to do with you.” Eloriaga retorted, “Why are you angry and why have you taken off your shoes? Probably you are also a Japanese spy like Josue.” The accused immediately turned around. Eloriaga left but later returned to the carinderia after failing to find Captain Yangson. He found the accused at the door with his right hand behind his back. The accused asked Eloriaga, “What were you telling me before?” and then immediately assaulted him with a penknife. Eloriaga defended himself with a rattan chair. Weakened by his wounds, Eloriaga fell on his back. The accused, in an attitude of delivering the fatal blow and saying, “Your time has come,” received a kick from Eloriaga that threw him about four meters backward. In the struggle, the accused gave Eloriaga about ten penknife blows, but only two hit their mark: one caused a penetrating wound 3 cm. wide and 4 cm. deep in the epigastric region, affecting the outer part of the stomach; the other was a penetrating wound in the chest at the fourth intercostal space, affecting the lung. These wounds were mortal and would have caused Eloriaga’s death if not for the timely medical assistance provided by Dr. Fores at San Lucas Hospital, Manila, for fifteen days.
The accused did not deny inflicting these wounds but alleged he acted in self-defense. As a witness, the accused testified that Eloriaga came to the carinderia and insulted him, calling him a spy and a shameless person. The accused pleaded for patience as it was Maundy Thursday. According to the accused, Eloriaga threw a stone (Exhibit 2) with both hands, which grazed his chest and fell on his left foot. The accused then entered the carinderia, took a penknife from a table, and told Eloriaga to leave. Instead, Eloriaga took a rattan chair (Exhibit 3), raised it high, and said he would smash it on the accused’s head. Eloriaga struck the accused with the chair, breaking its rear leg on the accused’s left shoulder. The accused immediately attacked Eloriaga with penknife blows.
The trial judge described the stone as 5 1/2 inches long, 4 inches wide, 4 inches thick, and weighing one and a half kilos. The court found the accused’s claim that such a heavy stone, allegedly thrown with force by a “big and brawny athlete,” merely grazed his chest and fell on his foot to be absurd and unworthy of consideration.

ISSUE

1. Whether the accused committed the crime of frustrated homicide or merely serious physical injuries.
2. Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia) attended the commission of the crime.
3. Whether the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation (obcecación) and vindication of a grave offense were correctly appreciated.

RULING

The Supreme Court, in its decision of February 6, 1946, and its resolution on the motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1946, ruled as follows:
1. The crime committed is Frustrated Homicide (Articles 249 and 50, Revised Penal Code). The proven facts clearly reveal the accused’s intent to kill Eloriaga. The attack was frontal and furious, with the accused delivering about ten blows. When Eloriaga fell on his back, the accused, with weapon in hand and in an attitude of delivering the final blow, exclaimed, “Your time has come” (Katapusan mo na ngayon). Only the kick from Eloriaga, which threw the accused backward, frustrated this intent to kill. The accused’s words and actions are the best proof of his homicidal intent. The defense’s citation of jurisprudence supporting a finding of mere physical injuries was unavailing, as the circumstances in those cited cases (e.g., People vs. Villanueva, U.S. vs. Mendoza, People vs. Yabot) were distinguishable—involving abandonment of the attack, use of a weapon merely to intimidate, or lack of a clear frustrated act. Here, the accused’s persistent attack and declared intent demonstrated a determined purpose to kill, which was only thwarted by the victim’s defensive act.
2. The qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia) is not present. The attack was carried out face-to-face. The accused even asked, “What were you telling me before?” before commencing the aggression. This question served as a warning of hostile intent, which is incompatible with a surprise attack. Citing U.S. vs. Idica and People vs. Mercado, the Court held that a frontal aggression, where the victim is facing the aggressor, does not constitute treachery.
3. Only one mitigating circumstance was correctly appreciated. The trial court considered two mitigating circumstances: (a) obfuscation (obcecación) and (b) vindication of a grave offense (having been insulted by being called a Japanese spy). The Supreme Court held that from one single fact—the insult—two distinct mitigating circumstances cannot arise. Following established doctrine and Viada’s commentaries, the Court recognized only the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense (Article 13, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code). The Court noted that given American forces had just retaken Manila, being called a Japanese spy could reasonably be considered a grave offense at that time, as espionage was severely punished under martial law.
DISPOSITION:
The accused is guilty of the crime of Frustrated Homicide. Considering the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense and in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law ( Act No. 4103 ), the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from a minimum of six (6) months and one (1) day of prisión correccional to a maximum of six (6) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor, with costs.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Briones dissented, believing the accused should be convicted only of serious physical injuries. He argued that the intent to kill was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, noting that the accused desisted from further attack at a moment when the victim’s relative defenselessness would have invited continued assault if there was a decided purpose to kill. He found the jurisprudence cited by the defense in its motion for reconsideration to be of great weight.