G.R. No. L-23996 March 15, 1974
PEDRO PACIS, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, petitioner, vs. MANUEL R. PAMARAN, as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, and RICARDO SANTOS, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Ricardo Santos owned a 1957 Mercury automobile originally imported tax-exempt by Donald James Hatch. Santos acquired the car and paid P311.00 in customs duties on June 25, 1964. Petitioner Pedro Pacis, the Acting Collector of Customs, later received information from the Department of National Defense labeling the vehicle a “hot car.” Upon checking his office records, Pacis discovered a discrepancy, finding that the proper duty collectible was approximately P2,500.00. Consequently, on July 22, 1964, Pacis instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention. Acting on this warrant, agents seized the car from a Manila street.
Santos, through counsel, demanded the car’s release, arguing the warrant’s issuance was unauthorized and threatening criminal action for usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code. Pacis refused, asserting his legal authority. Santos subsequently filed a criminal complaint for usurpation with the Manila City Fiscal’s Office, assigned to respondent Assistant City Fiscal Manuel R. Pamaran for preliminary investigation. As Pamaran intended to proceed, Pacis filed this prohibition suit to restrain the investigation, arguing his actions were within his official powers and thus could not constitute a crime.

ISSUE

Whether the Acting Collector of Customs, in issuing a warrant of seizure and detention for alleged customs violations, can be criminally prosecuted for usurpation of judicial functions.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, restraining the criminal investigation. The legal logic is anchored on the distinct and statutory-granted authority of customs officials. While the 1935 Constitution generally required a judicial warrant for searches and seizures, an established exception exists for customs and tariff laws. The Court, citing the precedent in Uy Kheytin v. Villareal and the more recent Papa v. Mago, clarified that seizures to enforce customs laws are not within the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Tariff and Customs Code ( Republic Act No. 1937 ) explicitly vests in customs officials the power and duty to seize property subject to forfeiture under customs laws.
Therefore, when Pacis issued the warrant of seizure and detention based on a discrepancy in paid customs duties, he was performing a lawful function expressly authorized by statute. His act was an exercise of an administrative, not a judicial, power. Consequently, his official action cannot form the basis for a criminal charge of usurpation of judicial functions, as he was not unlawfully assuming a role belonging to the judiciary but was acting within the scope of his delegated authority. To allow such a prosecution would have a chilling effect on the enforcement of customs laws. Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent an unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction by the fiscal over an act that was legally performed by a public official in the line of duty.