G.R. No. L-23967 November 29, 1968
ANTONINO M. MILANES, petitioner, vs. EULOGIO F. DE GUZMAN, Provincial Governor of La Union, VICE-GOVERNOR and MEMBERS OF THE PROVINCIAL BOARD of La Union, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Antonino M. Milanes was the elected municipal mayor of Agoo, La Union. On February 8, 1962, respondent Provincial Governor Eulogio F. de Guzman suspended him from office based on an administrative complaint. The complaint, filed by Rolando Rivera, charged petitioner with the crimes of slander by word, slander by deed, and serious threats allegedly committed during a public political rally for a Nacionalista Party congressional candidate on November 13, 1961. Petitioner acted as toastmaster at this rally. During his speech, he noticed Rivera in the crowd, depicted Rivera as having a physical deformity, then went down from the platform, held Rivera by the collar and neck, shook him violently, and threatened to kill him if he persisted in attacking petitioner’s administration. Criminal cases based on the same acts were filed but were dismissed by the Justice of the Peace Court of Agoo on the ground of prescription. Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of La Union, alleging the Governor acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and that the charges did not constitute grounds for disciplinary action under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The lower court issued writs of preliminary mandatory injunction (to reinstate petitioner) and preliminary injunction (to restrain the Provincial Board from hearing the administrative case), and later rendered judgment for petitioner, making the writs permanent. Respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court, as only questions of law were raised. By the time the Supreme Court took the case, petitioner’s term as mayor had already expired on December 31, 1963.

ISSUE

Whether the acts committed by petitioner during a political rally constitute “neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office” under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, warranting his administrative suspension.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that the acts imputed to petitioner did not constitute misconduct in office as defined under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The grounds for disciplinary action under the first part of said section apply only to acts or omissions committed “in office,” i.e., non-feasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance in office. Petitioner’s acts were performed in his private capacity as a toastmaster at a political party rally, not in the performance of his official duties as mayor. The function of toastmaster was neither part of nor connected to his mayoral duties. His behavior, prompted by personal affront due to attacks on his administration, was that of an “ordinary mortal” allowing wounded pride to obfuscate him, not that of a mayor performing official functions. The Court cited analogous precedents (Lacson vs. Roque, Mondano vs. Silvosa, Cornejo vs. Naval) where acts committed by mayors, though possibly facilitated by their office, were not considered misconduct in office because they were not performed in the discharge of official duties or by using the powers of the office. The distinction in Section 2188 between misconduct in office and conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude would be pointless if all crimes committed during tenure were considered official acts. The writs of injunction were made permanent. Costs were imposed on respondents. (The Court also noted the case had become moot due to the expiration of petitioner’s term, but proceeded to decide on the merits.)