G.R. No. L-23832 September 28, 1968
PROCESO APOLEGA, petitioner, vs. PERSEVERANDA HIZON, LUCIANO ALCANTARA and MARIANO PRIMICIAS, PRUDENCIO D. DEQUINA, AMADO M. ENRIQUEZ, HON. CESARIO PEREZ and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA, respondents.

FACTS

On May 26, 1961, Melanio Hizon filed a compensation claim for an injury sustained on January 5, 1961, while allegedly employed by petitioner Proceso Apolega. Petitioner received forms to fill out but failed to do so, though he alleges he verbally informed the office that Hizon was not his employee. On July 21, 1961, Regional Administrator Luciano Alcantara issued an award requiring petitioner to pay compensation. Melanio Hizon died on November 30, 1962. On January 22, 1963, his widow, Perseveranda Hizon, filed a death compensation claim. Petitioner received a copy but did not controvert it. An award was issued on February 22, 1963, and renewed on July 8, 1963. Petitioner was granted an extension to file a motion to vacate the award but failed to do so. The award was declared final and executory. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, through Associate Commissioner Cesario Perez, affirmed the award’s finality on July 24, 1964. The Regional Office, through Prudencio D. Dequina, issued a writ of execution pursuant to Section 51 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as amended by Republic Act 4119. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the award’s validity and the constitutionality of the law authorizing the execution.

ISSUE

1. Whether the claim was time-barred.
2. Whether the hearing officer’s failure to set the case for hearing and give notice amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
3. Whether Section 17 of Republic Act 4119, which authorizes the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and its deputized officials to issue writs of execution, is constitutional.

RULING

1. No, the claim was not time-barred. Petitioner’s failure to controvert the claims as required by Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act waived his right to present evidence and to complain about lack of hearing. The failure to file the claim within the period prescribed in Section 24 was non-jurisdictional and did not bar the proceeding, especially since petitioner did not suffer from the delay. Furthermore, partial payment of benefits by petitioner (P530.00) rendered the filing of the claim within the time limit unnecessary under Section 24 as amended.
2. No, there was no grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner’s failure to controvert the claims waived his right to a hearing. The hearing officer could properly make an award without a formal hearing, treating the claim as uncontested. Petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard when granted an extension to file a motion to vacate, which he failed to utilize.
3. Yes, Section 17 of Republic Act 4119 is constitutional. The law expressly vests the power to enforce awards in the Commission or its duly deputized officials. This grant of power does not contravene the Constitution. While execution is procedural and falls within the Supreme Court’s rule-making power, Congress may legislate on it under its authority to “repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.” The legislative intent to vest such power in the Commission is clear, unlike the previous Reorganization Plan 20-A, which lacked legislative sanction. The writ of execution issued by respondent Prudencio D. Dequina is valid.
The petition was dismissed, and the preliminary injunction was dissolved.