GR L 2378; (April, 1951) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-2378 April 27, 1951
JOSE MA. ANSALDO, petitioner-appellee, vs. FIDELITY AND SURETY COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS
The appellant, Fidelity and Surety Company, obtained a money judgment against Romarico Agcaoili and Angel A. Ansaldo. A writ of execution was issued on April 11, 1933, and a notice of levy was noted on Transfer Certificates of Title on April 17, 1933, concerning Angel A. Ansaldo’s interest in the properties. No further action was taken on this writ and levy. On July 30, 1947, the appellee, Jose Ma. Ansaldo, who alleged to have inherited the properties, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying for the cancellation of the notice of levy due to the appellant’s inaction for over fourteen years. The appellant opposed, arguing the attachment liens were still valid and enforceable. The lower court granted the appellee’s petition for cancellation, ruling that the appellant’s right to enforce the judgment had prescribed. The appellant appealed this order.
ISSUE
Whether the appellant’s right to enforce its judgment through the levied properties had prescribed, thereby warranting the cancellation of the notice of levy.
RULING
Yes, the right had prescribed. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from its entry. After that period and before being barred by the statute of limitations, it may be enforced by action. The prescriptive period for an action to enforce a judgment is ten years under Section 43, Paragraph 1 of Act No. 190 , commencing from the date the judgment is entered, not from the expiration of the five-year period for execution by motion. Applying this rule, even assuming April 11, 1933 (the date of the writ’s issuance) as the date of judgment entry, more than ten years had elapsed by July 30, 1947, when the petition for cancellation was filed. Thus, the judgment was barred by prescription. The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that there was no time limit for selling levied property, distinguishing the cited case of Government vs. Echaus, as the execution sale there occurred within the ten-year period for enforcement by action. The Court also held that execution is accomplished by both levy and sale under the rules, and mere levy does not constitute full execution.