G.R. No. L-23476; August 31, 1965
ARISTOTLE TUASON, petitioner, vs. HON. CALIXTO O. ZALDIVAR, in his capacity as Actg. Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR MARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and HON. EULALIO PICHAY, in his capacity as Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Aristotle Tuason was appointed Municipal Judge of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, on an ad interim basis on October 4, 1960, after having served as Municipal Judge of San Ildefonso, Ilocos Sur, from July 17, 1957, to October 8, 1960. On March 10, 1961, auxiliary Municipal Judge Francisco Ante filed administrative charges against Tuason with the Commission on Appointments. Despite these charges, Tuason’s ad interim appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 5, 1961. Prior to this confirmation, on April 26, 1961, Ante filed a complaint with the Department of Justice reproducing the charges, which were referred for investigation to Judge Angelino C. Salanga of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Additional charges were filed on June 11, 1962. After investigation, Judge Salanga submitted a report dated March 11, 1964, finding Tuason guilty of some charges and recommending his separation from service. On August 31, 1964, the President issued Administrative Order No. 108, which considered Tuason resigned and separated as Municipal Judge of Vigan, without prejudice to reinstatement in another branch of government. Tuason filed this original action for certiorari and prohibition to annul the Administrative Order, arguing that the causes for removal were insufficient and pertained to acts committed during his prior tenure in San Ildefonso, which had already been considered and rejected by the Commission on Appointments during his confirmation.

ISSUE

Whether the Administrative Order separating petitioner Aristotle Tuason from service as Municipal Judge of Vigan is valid, considering the sufficiency of the grounds for separation and the fact that the acts cited occurred during his prior tenure and were arguably passed upon by the Commission on Appointments during his confirmation.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Administrative Order No. 108 and dismissed the petition. The Court found that while individual counts (such as imposing an incorrect sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Act, approving a guardian’s bond on a criminal bail bond form, considering an unalleged aggravating circumstance, and inadequate notice of leave to his auxiliary judge) might not alone warrant separation, their collective effect, combined with more serious counts (holding the positions of municipal judge and municipal councilor simultaneously while collecting emoluments for both, and signing a political resolution as councilor while serving as judge), demonstrated a deficiency in the prudence, discretion, and judgment required of a judiciary member. The Court emphasized that the President’s administrative discretion in such matters is supreme within its sphere and should not be interfered with by the judiciary unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse. Neither the prior occurrence of most acts nor their consideration by the Commission on Appointments during confirmation negates their adverse effect on Tuason’s fitness to continue in office or the authority to discipline him. The writ was denied, and the petition dismissed, with costs against petitioner.