GR L 23433; (February, 1968) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-23433 February 10, 1968
GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson filed an action in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles on the ground of bigamy. She alleged that prior to their marriage on May 27, 1958, Robles had a previous and subsisting marriage to Josefina Fausto, who had even filed a criminal bigamy case against him. Jocson also sought damages, claiming physical maltreatment during cohabitation. In his answer, Robles also assailed the marriage’s validity but claimed his consent was obtained through force, threat, and intimidation by Jocson’s parents, who allegedly knew he was already married. Robles later filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming no genuine issue of fact existed, supported by a joint affidavit from Jocson’s father and brother. Jocson submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings. The lower court denied the motion for summary judgment on December 23, 1963, ruling that proof of a prior subsisting marriage was necessary and not met by the motion, and also finding indications of collusion between the parties. The court later dismissed the action on March 9, 1964, after both parties failed to appear at a hearing. Robles appealed the orders dated December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the lower court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment and whether the appeal was perfected in accordance with procedural rules.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. First, on procedural grounds, the record on appeal failed to contain data showing that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period as required by Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which is a jurisdictional requirement. On the merits, the Court affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion for summary judgment. It held that Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the motion for summary judgment were deemed to practically amount to these prohibited methods. Therefore, the lower court correctly required further proof, particularly regarding the existence of a prior subsisting marriage, before any decree of annulment could be rendered.